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MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, SECOND
BEST, AND THE ANTITRUST PARADOX:
A REVIEW ARTICLEt
Richard S. Markpvits*
By
Robert H. Bork. New York: Basic Books, Inc. 1978. Pp. xi, 462.
$18.
Professor Robert Bork's Antitrust Paradox 1 is likely to be an
influential book. Bork teaches at a law school (Yale) whose graduates greatly influence American regulatory policy; he enjoys the
intellectual respect of the legal academic community; and he is
well-connected both with the antitrust bar and (as a former Solicitor General) with many relevant government personnel. The
book is written in a clear, remarkably entertaining style and
should be comprehensible to the rapidly increasing number of law
students and practitioners who are conversant with economics at
the very elementary level it presupposes. Moreover, the book's
publication is timely: its appearance coincides with the development of a consensus in the relevant governmental communities
that both antitrust law and its enforcement should be strengthened - a consensus manifested by the rapid growth of the Antitrust Division's budget, a rise in judicial hostility to mergers and
even to internal corporate growth, and the serious legislative consideration of various deconcentration proposals that would substantially increase the effect of antitrust law on the structure of
American industry.
In short, The Antitrust Paradox is likely to be read at a
critical time for American antitrust policy by many strategically
placed people who will be able to understand Bork's arguments.
Those arguments support five basic propositions: (1) the legislature and judiciary have misunderstood the business functions and
economic effects of many of the practices to which the antitrust
laws apply; (2) in particular, vertical contracts and mergers, horiTHE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF.
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General of the United States.
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zontal mergers, conglomerate mergers, and internal growth are
likely to produce far more allocatively desirable "business economies"2 than the legislature and courts have supposed; (3) oligopolistic, predatory, and retaliatory pricing would rarely be profitable in a world without antitrust; (4) business activities (including mergers) will reduce competition only if they produce a firm
with a very high market share in a highly concentrated market;
and therefore, (5) allocative efficiency would be increased if business practices and structures were regulated far less stringently,
rather than more stringently, as current deconcentration proposals recommend. Although I agree with the first two propositions,
I disagree with the third, fourth, and hence the fifth. More particularly, in my opinion, Bork's arguments for these last three propositions are vitiated by their failure to deal adequately both with
the product and locational differentiation that define monopolistic competition and with the interdependencies that are emphasized by second best. 3
This Review discusses those portions of Bork's argument that
I believe are undermined by monopolistic competition and second
best. I should emphasize at the outset that this focus precludes a
balanced picture of The Antitrust Paradox. Thus, this Review
almost totally ignores the valid core of Bork's essay: (1) his argument that the antitrust laws contain an economic test of legality;
(2) his demonstration that partnerships, various vertical practices, horizontal mergers, and even conglomerate mergers can all
generate considerable business efficiencies; and (3) his description of the way in which the courts have used various fallacious
legal doctrines to condemn practices as anticompetitive without
any theoretical or empirical justification. In fact, many academicians who specialize in antitrust will probably feel that the disagreements I will emphasize are less important than our shared
position both on the above issues and on the appropriateness
of predicting the economic impact of business behavior on the
assumption that relevant actors seek to maximize their shareholders' welfare. Nevertheless, this Review's focus can be justified on two grounds. First, my disagreements with Bork are far
2. Professor Bork uses this expression to cover not only static cost reductions but also
product improvements and expansion-inducing (dynamic) efficiencies that increase the
profits of the firm in question. See id. at 7.
3. I .will use the expressions "second best" and "second-best theory" to refer to the
body of analysis that focuses on the fact that two imperfections may offset each other and
the related conclusion that in an inevitably imperfect world more imperfections may be
preferable to fewer.
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from inconsequential. They have led me to very different legal
and policy answers to almost every question The Antitrust Paradox explores. Second,. Bork's lucid and lively exposition makes
it unnecessary for me to cover once more our common ground.
Readers who wish to traverse this territory can want no better
guide than The Antitrust Paradox itself.
This Review has two parts. The first defines a series of concepts I have developed to illuminate the various monopolistic
competition phenomena and second-best interdependencies that
Bork and all other traditional antitrust analysts have ignored.
The second uses these tools to criticize Bork's discussion of (1) the
particular economic test of legality American antitrust laws contain; (2) the appropriate way to predict the allocative efficiency
of any business practice; (3) the feasibility of oligopolistic, retaliatory, or predatory behavior; (4) the preconditions for a horizontal merger's reducing competition; (5) the operational definition
of monopoly and the actual character of various kinds of allegedly
"monopolizing" behavior; (6) the allocative efficiency of various
vertical practices; and (7) the competitive impact and allocative
efficiency of both conglomerate mergers and the toe-hold merger
doctrine.

L

SOME lNTRODUCTORY VOCABULARY

In this Part, I will define four central sets of concepts. In
particular, I will (1) define and distinguish between the effect of
a business practice on competition and its impact on allocative
efficiency, (2) differentiate several components (such as basic
competitive advantages and oligopolistic margins) of the overall
gap between price and marginal cost, (3) identify three types of
factors that can enable firms to earn supranormal profits on their
most profitable projects (distinguish, that is, three types of factors that influence the intensity of what I call quality-or-varietyincreasing [QV] investment4 competition5), and (4) define the
types of QV investment misallocation antitrust policy can affect.
4. QV investments are investments that function by changing the demand curve the
investor faces. Typical QV investments are investments in additional or superior product
variants, additional or superior distributive locations, or additional capacity or inventory
(which increase the speed with which the investor can supply his customers at times of
peak demand).
5. The phrase "QV investment competition" refers to the process in which firms
compete away their supranormal profits by introducing new or additional product variants, distributive outlets, capacity, or inventory.
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A. Increasing Competition vs. Increasing Allocative Efficiency

Roughly speaking, an event or legal doctrine will be said to
increase competition if it creates more dollar gains than dollar
losses6 for the customers of both the firm involved and its product-market rivals (though not necessarily for each individual customer). This result could obtain either because the event or doctrine increases price competition (i.e., lowers the prices such buyers have to pay for a given set of product-distributive vari'ants)
or because it increases QV investment competition (i.e., increases
the quality or variety of the products and services they are offered). In contrast, an event or legal doctrine will be said to increase allocative efficiency only if on balance it creates more dollar gains than dollar losses for all the various parties it affects.
Obviously, then, since an event that benefits on balance the customers of both the firm involved and its product-market rivals
(henceforth Rs) may injure on balance the other parties it affects
(e.g., stockholders of various injured rivals or buyers of the goods
that would have been produced with the resources used to increase the firm's unit output), there is no definitional guarantee
that an event that increases competition may not decrease allocative efficiency or vice versa. Nor can one establish this relationship by citing the fact that allocative efficiency will be maximized
if competition is everywhere perfect and various other so-called
Pareto optimal conditions are met, for that fact has no bearing
on the allocative efficiency of increasing competition, other
Pareto imperfections, or both. In fact, although, as we shall see,
various second-best arguments can be made for the allocative
efficiency of pro-price competition policies both in general and in
particular circumstances, increases in QV investment competition are far more allocatively suspect in our inevitably imperfect
world. Hence, we must recognize the distinction between the allocative efficiency and competitive impact of a business practice or
antitrust doctrine.
6. The beneficiaries' dollar gains should be measured by the number of dollars they
would have to be paid to make them as well off as they would be if the merger were
executed (assuming that their receipt of the dollars would not affect their welfare indirectly - e.g., by being fmanced by a tax on individuals who would otherwise have patronized them). The victims' dollar losses should be measured by the number of dollars they
would have to lose to make them as bad off as they would be if the merger were executed
(assuming that they would not be indirectly affected by the loss in question).

Jan.-Mar. 1979]
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B. The Components of a Firm's Price-Marginal Cost Gap
Price theorists have always focused on the aggregate gap between a firm's price and its marginal cost (P-MC). However, in
our monopolistically competitive world, in which product and
locational differentiation are significant, we cannot analyze the
competitive effects and allocative efficiency of business behavior
or legal doctrines without distinguishing several components of
the P-MC gap. To simplify my exposition, I will discuss only
individualized pricing situations, in which sellers set separate
prices with each of the buyers for whom they deal.7 In particular,
I will examine the gap between the individualized price actually
charged by a best-placed supplier,8 X, of some particular buyer,
Y, and that seller's conventional marginal cost. I will distinguish
two major and four minor components of this gap. The two major
components of the P-MC gap are divided by the "highest nonoligopolistic price" (HNOP). This is the price that would maximize
a best-placed seller's profits in a perfectly informed world if he
could not profit from oligopolistic pricing. In other words, a bestplaced seller's highest nonoligopolistic price is the highest price
he could charge without being profitably undercut by any rival,
assuming that the best-placed seller in question could not react
to such undercutting.
In my vocabulary, the gap between such a firm X's highest
nonoligopolistic price and actual price (P-HNOP) is its "oligopolistic margin" (OM). X's oligopolistic margin (and oligopolistic
pricing) is "contrived" when he has tried to deter undercutting
by threatening to sacrifice his interests in order to punish his
rivals' noncooperation by retaliating or by promising to reward
his rivals' cooperation by reciprocating (i.e., by foregoing a
profitable opportunity to undercut an OM the rival has charged).
X's oligopolistic margin (and oligopolistic pricing) is "natural"
when he can assume that his rivals will not undercut because they
realize that his nonoligopolistic, profit-maximizing response
7. Sometimes sellers post prices that apply across-the-board to all buyers interested
in their products. In the text that follows, such situations will be referred to as acrossthe-board pricing contexts.
8. A seller Xis said to be best-placed to supply a particular buyer Y ifhe could profit
from supplying Y on terms that no one else would find intrinsically profitable to match.
Obviously, since different buyers will have different product and locational preferences
in our monopolistically competitive world, the fact that X is best-placed to serve some
buyer YI implies little about the likelihood that he will be best-placed to supply other
buyers Y2 ... N.
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would make such conduct unprofitable. 9
I also subdivide the gap between a best-placed seller's marginal cost and his highest nonoligopolistic price. In individualized
pricing contexts, this gap reflects (1) the seller's "basic competitive advantage" (BCA) and (2) the contextual costs his closest
rival would have to incur to beat his HNOP.
In my terminology, "basic competitive advantage" refers to
the short-run position of a seller vis-a-vis a particular buyer he is
best-placed to serve. More precisely, a best-placed seller's basic
competitive advantage in his relations with his customer equals
the amount by which that buyer prefers the best-placed seller's
product or distributive variant to the offering of that seller's closest rival for the buyer's patronage, plus the amount by which the
short-run conventional marginal costs the best-placed seller has
to incur to supply this buyer fall below those of his closest rival
for this buyer's patronage-i.e., equals the sum of the best-placed
seller's buyer preference advantage and his short-run marginal
cost advantage. 10
The contextual component of a best-placed seller's (X's) PMC gap reflects costs his closest rival must incur (because of the
terms he would have to charge) to beat the best-placed seller's
HNOP. Since price discrimination tends to encourage favored
customers to engage in arbitrage, disfavored customers to intensify their bargaining, and the government or private parties to
bring Robinson-Patman Act suits, rivals who charge their own
customers supramarginal-cost prices must incur contextual marginal costs to charge X's customers the discriminatory, low,
marginal-cost prices necessary to beat X's HNOP. The contextual component of X's HNOP can also be described as the sum
of X's contextual marginal costs and his contextual cost advantage (CCA) over his closest rival. Best-placed sellers normally
enjoy such CCAs because their HNOPs are normally less discriminatory than their closest rivals' matching offers. Hence, a bestplaced seller's overall competitive advantage (OCA) usually exceeds his BCA (by an amount equal to his CCA) .11
9. In my opinion, this distinction between contrived and natural oligopolistic pricing
has substantial legal significance. In brief, I believe that contrived oligopolistic pricing
violates the Sherman Act while natural oligopolistic pricing does not.
10. Obviously, in individual cases, a best-placed seller's BCA may equal the difference between his product preference advantage and short-run marginal cost disadvantage
or vice versa.
11. For an analysis of the across-the-board counterparts for these terms, see Markovits, Predicting the Competitive Impact of Horizontal Mergers in a Monopolistically Com-
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C. The Determinants of the Intensity of Quality- or VarietyIncreasing Investment Competition
Economists have generally assumed that the intensity of QV
investment competition and price competition depend on identical factors. In fact, however, the determinants of the relationship
between price and (conventional) marginal cost, on the one hand,
and of the (nominal) 12 rate of return established firms can realize
in equilibrium on their most profitable QV investment projects,
on the other, differ substantially. 13
In brief, 14 three sets of factors influence the intensity of QV
investment competition. The first set contains the various barriers to entry that would deter the QV investment of the firm that
would be the best-placed potential entrant to the "market" 15 at
the entry-barring QV investment level. These barriers all deter
entry by reducing the supranormal rate of return the potential
entrant anticipates realizing after entry to a level below the rate
the established firms realized befor~ entry on their most profitable projects. More particularly, the profit-differential barrier to
entry (1r 0 ) reflects those factor~ that would reduce the new entrant's weighted average expected post-entry rate of return below
the rate the established firms would expect to realize on their
most profitable projects post-entry even if the threat of retaliation could be ignored. The risk barrier to entry (R) refers to those
factors that increase the normal rate of return for the best-placed
new entrant above its counterpart rate for the established firms
on their most successful projects (e.g., product variants or outlets). The scale barrier to entry (S) measures the extent to which
petitive World: A Non-Market Oriented Proposal and Critique of the Market Definition,
Market Share-Market Concentration Approach, 56 TExAs L. REv. 587, 637-40 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Horizontal Mergers].
12. For the meaning and relevance of the word "nominal," see text following note 15
infra.
13. In part, such differences reflect the direct effect potential competition has on the
intensity of QV investment competition. See Markovits, Potential Competition, Limit
Price Theory, and the Legality of Horizontal and Conglomerate Mergers Under the American Antitrust Laws, 1975 WIS. L. REv. 658 [hereinafter cited as Limit Price Theory].
However, in part, they reflect the facts that in individualized pricing markets QV investment moves have more widespread effects than price moves, that in most markets they
affect different groups of sellers than price moves, and that in all markets they 'are less
reversible than price moves.
14. For a more complete set of definitions and illustrations, see Horizontal Mergers,
supra note 11, at 660-73.
15. "Market" is in quotation marks to reflect the fact that none of my legal and policy
proposals presuppose the possibility of defining markets in a nonarbitrary way. See Horizontal Mergers, supra note 11, at 595-602.
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the best-placed potential entrant's entry will reduce everyone's
rate of return. The retaliation barrier to entry (L) measures the
extent to which the new entrant's expected rate of return over the
full life of his investment is reduced by the possibility that his
established rivals may retaliate against his entry.
The second set of such factors contains the barriers to expansion that would deter the QV investment of the established firm
that would be best-placed to execute a QV investment if QV
investment in the relevant market had reached the level it would
contain in equilibrium if entry were precluded. Once more, analogous 1rD, R, S, and L* barriers to expansion (where the asterisk
indicates the hypothetical, entry-precluded assumption) account
for the fact that this best-placed expander's expected, postexpansion, nominal supranormal rate of return will be lower than
the rate the established firms would expect to realize absent expansion on their most profitable projects.
The third set of such factors relates to the fact that the actual
rate of return such a best-placed expander will anticipate realizing on his expansion may differ from the nominal rate of return
a conventionally kept set of books would indicate. Thus, to the
extent that such an expander realfzes that his failure to expand
would not induce anyone else to add to his market's QV investment level, his expansion's actual profitability will be reduced by
the amount of profits his new project takes from his old (by taking
sales away from his original products or outlets or by inducing his
rivals to lower their prices). That is, the best-placed expander will
face a "monopolistic investment disincentive" (M*) 16 equal to the
ratio of such avoidable damages to the size of the envisaged QV
investment. (When in the more general case an expander realizes
that his expansion will deter someone else from a QV investment
that would be more damaging to his pre-existing capital than his
own expansion, he will face a monopolistic incentive to expand.)
In any case, within this framework, the intensity of QV investment competition (i.e., the rate of return the established firms
can realize in equilibrium on their most profitable QV investment
projects) will be determined by the lower of (7rn + R + S + L)N
at the entry-barring QV investment level and (7r D + R + S + L*)E
16. In some circumstances, such an expander will realize that although none of his
rivals would invest if he did not, some would expand if he makes a QV investment, In
such situations, the expander in question is said to face an oligopolistic investment disincentive (0). In order to simplify my exposition, such Odisincentives will be ignored in the
text that follows.
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+ M* at the entry-precluded, expansion-barring QV investment
level, where N and E respectively stand for the relevant bestplaced potential entrant and expander .17
D. Three Types of QV Investment Misallocation
Until recently, economists who analyze the optimality of the
set of goods the economy produces rarely considered the possibility that an inefficient set of product or distributive types might
be produced. In fact, except when so-called public goods 18 were
involved, such economists considered only "relative unit output"
(RUO) misallocation - the possibility that the economy might
produce too many units of some goods and too few units of other
goods that were still in production. Recently, however, economists have asked whether imperfections in price competition
(and other Pareto imperfections) may cause the economy to produce the wrong set of product or distributive types even when
public good problems do not arise. In fact, three types of such QV
investment misallocation can be distinguished: intra-industry
QV investment misallocation, inter-industry QV investment misallocation, and quantity-vs.-QV investment misallocation. In
brief, intra-industry QV investment misallocation is present
where a transaction-costless transfer of resources could increase
allocative efficiency by changing the set of product or distributive
variants some industry produced without changing the amount of
QV investment it contained. Inter-industry QV investment misallocation is present where such transfer could increase allocative
efficiency by increasing the QV investment {product variants,
distributive variants, capacity, or inventory) in some industries
17. Where (1r 0 + R + S + L)N is less than (1r 0 + R + S + L*)E + M* at the
entry-preventing level, the entry-preventing level of QV investment is determinative
because it is higher than the entry-precluded, expansion-barring QV investment level
- i.e., because the presence of potential competition will preclude the established firms
from taking advantage of the ability they would otherwise have to restrict their own QV
investments. On the other hand, where (1ro + R + S + L*)E + M* is less than
(11" 0 + R + S + L)N, at the entry-preventing level, the entry-precluded, expansionbarring QV investment level will be determinative because it is higher than the entrybarring QV investment level - i.e., because the established firms' inability to restrict
their QV investments will preclude them from taking advantage of the opportunities the
existing barriers to entry present.
18. Although the term "public goods" has been used in other ways as well, I believe
it is most usefully employed to refer to products whose marginal costs would be less than
their average total cost at the output at which their demand and marginal cost curves
would interesect if the other Pareto optimal conditions were fulfilled. Public goods cause
problems in an otherwise Pareto optimal world because, if they are priced at their marginal cost, they will not be produced, while if they are priced at their average total cost,
they will be underproduced.
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and decreasing it in others. Finally, quantity-vs.-QV investment
misallocation is present where such a transfer could increase allocative efficiency by causing the economy to produce more physical units of a less diversified, less conveniently distributed, less
quickly delivered set of products (or vice versa) - i.e., by producing a situation in which fewer (more) resources are allocated to
QV investment uses and more (fewer) to uses that increase unit
output.
This section has developed a series of concepts that I will now
use to analyze Bork's position on most of the issues he addresses.
Obviously, such a conceptual structure is never "right" or
"wrong." Its value depends solely on its ability to facilitate the
identification and solution of the problems it is used to analyze.
I hope that the analysis that follows will enable me to carry the
burden of proof that any proponent of a new vocabulary should
be made to bear.
For the reader's convenience, the abbreviations used in this
Review are here summarized.
BCA
Basic Competitive Advantage
BPA
Buyer Preference Advantage
CCA
Contextual Cost Advantage
CMC
Contextual Marginal Cost
ABSThe reduction in buyer surplus generated by
a particular marginal increase in a product's
price
The increase in seller surplus generated by a
ASS+
particular marginal increase in a product's
price
ATSThe reduction in transaction surplus
generated by a particular marginal increase
in a product's price
Highest Nonoligopolistic Price
HNOP
Retaliation Barrier (to entry or expansion)
L
Monopolistic Investment Disincentive
M*
Marginal Cost
MC
Marginal Allocative Cost
MLC
Marginal Allocative Value
MLV
Oligopolistic Margin
OM
Overall Marginal Cost
OMC
p
Price
QV
Quality-or-Variety-Increasing
(investment)
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Risk Barrier (to entry or expansion)
Relative Unit Output (misallocation)
Scale Barrier (to entry or expansion)
Transaction-Surplus-Maximizing (output)
Profit-Differential Barrier (to entry or
expansion)
MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION, SECOND BEST, AND BORK'S
LEGAL AND POLICY CONCLUSIONS

A.

The American Antitrust Laws' Particular Economic Test of
Legality

As I have already suggested, Bork argues persuasively that
the American antitrust laws contain an economic test of legality.
This section will analyze his more specific contention that since
"the only legitimate goal of American antitrust law is the maximization of consumer welfare," the statutes must be presumed to
use words like "competition" as "terms of art" that should be
operationally defined in terms of "consumer welfare" - i.e.,
that acts should be held to decrease competition or constitute
monopolization or agreements in restraint of trade only if they
decrease "consumer welfare." More precisely, since Bork uses
"consumer welfare" itself as a term of art, equivalent to the
applied welfare economist's phrase "allocative efficiency," 19 this
section will focus on the contention that acts should be held to
violate the antitrust laws only if they create more dollar losses
than gains.
I have two basic objections to Professor Bork's discussion of
the antitrust laws' economic test of legality. The first goes to the
substance of his contention that the antitrust laws were intended
to foster allocative efficiency. Although I am persuaded by Professor Bork's arguments that the history, language, and structure20
of the antitrust laws preclude construing the statutes to achieve
various noneconomic {primarily political and social) goals, this
19. Except for one lapse in which he equates increases in consumer welfare with an
increase in utility, Bork specifies that any act that creates more dollar gains than losses
increases "consumer welfare." R. Boruc, supra note 1, at 297.
20. I am less persuaded by the argument Professor Bork derives from his assumption
about the appropriate role for a judiciary to play in a democratic society- largely because
I believe that at least in theocy judges can balance competing considerations of significantly different character without reference to their own personal values. I should note
that Professor Bork has taken this position against balancing in other contexts as well.
See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1
(1971).
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conclusion does not imply that the laws were devised to promote
allocative efficiency. Roughly speaking, I believe that the purpose
of the American antitrust laws is to protect buyers from being
injured by behavior undertaken-by sellers with the "intent"
(Sherman Act) 21 or the effect (Clayton Act) 22 ofreducing competition, in the sense of reducing the attractiveness of the offers
against which the actors and sometimes their product-market
rivals must compete when best-placed. As we shall see, this premise would lead to quite different legal tests from Bork's. Second,
however, even if the American antitrust laws contained an allocative efficiency test, Bork's use of the phrase "consumer welfare"
would distort this test. Although Bork's "consumer welfare" test
is dollar-oriented and is not solely concerned with the position of
the relevant actor's customers, "consumer welfare" has unjustified emotive force for those interested in the distribution of income, a force Bork could have avoided by calling his test an
allocative efficiency test of legality. This description would also
have facilitated his discussion of those vertical practices which
clearly would injure the buyer!, they affect even if they were as
allocatively efficient as he supposes.
Let me proceed, then, to describe the tests I believe the Sherman and Clayton Acts prescribe. In my opinion, the Sherman Act
condemns conduct whose profitability was expected to depend on
its-tendency to reduce the attractiveness of offers against which
the accused parties compete. For example, price-fixing agreements, horizontal mergers, and individual or joint acts of retaliation or predation would violate the Act if their participants would
not have expected23 to find them profitable but for their tendency
to reduce the attractiveness of a rival's offer by inducing him to
make less attractive bids or by eliminating him as an independent force in the marketplace. 24 Correlatively, a practice that
21. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)).
22. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976)).
23. Although this test is subjective, the relevant intent would probably be demonstrated most often through objective evidence.
24. More specifically, I would argue that § 1 should be interpreted to prohibit agreements whose profitability depended on their reducing the attractiveness of the offers their
participants give to each other's customers while § 2 should be interpreted to prohibit
single-firm or multi-firm conduct whose profitability depends on its reducing the attractiveness of the offers one or more innocent parties make to the customers of the accused.
On this account, a price-fixing agreement would violate § 1, predatory or retaliatory behavior would violate § 2, and a horizontal merger could violate either § 1 (if its profitability depended on its reducing the competition the merger partners gave each other)
and/or § 2 (if its profitability depended on its reducing the competition remaining rivals
gave the merger partners).
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reduced the attractiveness of rival offers would not violate the
Sherman Act if its profitability were not expected to depend on
its reducing the attractiveness of rival offers - if it were
"ancillary" in this sense to some legitimate business p~rposes
such as achieving what Bork calls "business efficiencies" or enabling a seller to take better advantage of a ,given demandmarginal cost position. In brief, this interpretation fits better
with the language, criminal prov.isions, and tort antecedents of
the Sherman Act and with th~ scheme of Ameripan regulatory
policy, which recognizes the legitimacy of securing profitable positions by increasing efficiency and capitalizing on such positions
by exploiting the resulting demand-marginal cost combination.
Compared with Bork's, this interpretation has three further advantages: (1) it defines "ancillary" better than Bork's "primary
effect" test; 25 (2) it explains why behavior that clearly infores·the
actor's customers (by removing consumer surplus) does not violate the Sherman Act despite its tendency to· reduce consumer
welfare in the most obvious literal sense; and (3) it accounts for:
(a) the fact that the legality of an act that is anti-competitive in
my sense could not be established by a demonstration that it
would not misallocate resources in our worse-than-second-best
world and (b) the fact that a misallocative act would not be said
to violate the Sherman Act if its profitability did not depend on
any tendency it had to reduce the_ attractiveness of the offers
against which the actor had to compete (or, a fortiori, if it had
no such tendency).
Admittedly, since the Clayton Act speaks of the effects of
behavior rather than the intent of the relevant actors, the Sherman Act test should not be applied in Clayton Act litigation. In
particular, with two possible exceptions, behavior covered by the
Clayton Act should be said to violate its terms if and only if it
reduces competition in the sense of reducing on balance the attractiveness of the offers against which best-placed suppliers
must compete (including both the actor in question and his
product-market rivals). On this interpretation, a horizontal
merger would violate the Clayton Act if it reduced the attractiveness of the offers made by non-best-placed suppliers even .if its
profitability did not depend on any such consequence. Indeed, on
this interpretation, the Clayton Act might even condemn a horizontal merger that did not reduce the attractiveness of the rival
25. See R. Boru<, supra note 1, at 136, 334.
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offers the parties to the merger faced- e.g., if the merger reduced
the attractiveness of the offers the merger partners made to their
rivals' customers or the m~rger partners' rivals made to each
other's customers. The two exceptions I would read into this
Clayton Act test are difficult to reconcile with the language of the
statute. However, if the antitrust laws were devised to protect
buyers from direct injury by illegitimate business behavior, a
court might be authorized to condemn only those acts that do
injure the relevant buyers by reducing the attractiveness of rival
offers. In addition, one might (more problematically) argue that,
given the legitimacy of obtaining a natural monopoly under
American law, 28 the Clayton Act does not condemn practices that
do injure buyers by reducing the attractiveness of the offers
against which best-placed suppliers must compete if those practices do so by creating allocative efficiencies that induce inferior
rivals to exit.
Economically literate lawyers rarely distinguish between the
legality of a practice or act under the American antitrust laws and
the desirability of a policy prohibiting the behavior in question
(which they usually equate with the allocative efficiency of the
policy concerned). Bork's discussion of the antitrust laws' tests of
legality fits this surprising pattern. Although I am persuaded that
the antitrust laws contain an economic test of legality, they
should not be interpreted to condemn those acts and only those
acts that it would be allocatively efficient to condemn. At least
in part, my disagreement with Bork reflects my opinion that in
our worse-than-second-best world, courts that seek to increase
allocative efficiency often must condemn acts that are not anticompetitive and allow acts that are. Although I would probably
support legislation to increase the allocative efficiency of the antitrust laws, the courts are not authorized to interpret the law to
achieve that goal. I suspect Bork would agree with this contention
if he were persuaded that the connection between the allocative
efficiency of prohibiting a particular practice and its competitive
impact is as weak as I suppose. In any case, the tests I have
proposed are both more forthright than Bork's "consumer welfare" test and more compatible with the language, historical antecedents, criminal provisions, and statutory environment of the
American antitrust laws.
26. That legitimacy is made manifest by the patent laws, the "superior skill, foresight, and industry defense" to Sherman Act prosecutions, and the judicial practice of
arguing that condemned practices serve no legitimate business purpose.
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B. Predicting the Allocative Efficiency of Any Business Practice
This section will explore the relevance of monopolistic competition and second best both for Professor Bork's analysis of the
allocative efficiency of various business practices and for the appropriate way to analyze the allocative efficiency of alternative
antitrust doctrines. In particular, this section (1) explams how
supracompetitive prices distort resource allocation, (2) analyzes
the two premises on which Bork bases his allocative efficiency
predictions, (3) shows why - as Bork contends - second best
probably would preclude the development of an allocative efficiency rationale for pro-competitive policies if - as Bork assumes
- antitrust law could not affect the amount of resources allocated to producing quality and variety in different industries and
in the economy as a whole, and (4) explains why second best does
not preclude the development of an allocative efficiency rationale
for antitrust law in a monopolistically competitive world, in
which the set of product types the economy produces can be
affected by antitrust policy - i.e., examines whether and the
extent to which the supracompetitive prices that individually can ·
cause RUO misallocation, inter-industry QV investment misallocation, and quantity-vs.-QV investment misallocation will compound or offset each other in relation to each of these types of
misallocation.
1.

The Misallocative Tendency of Supracompetitive Pricing

Ceteris paribus, X's supracompetitive pricing will distort
resource allocation by artificially reducing the private cost Y
must incur to purchase the resources producer X would otherwise
have used to produce his marginal unit of output below the allocative cost of Y's removing the resources from X (the allocative
value of the foregone marginal unit of X's product X). Roughly
speaking, the private and allocative cost of Y's bidding resources
away from X diverge because of three relationships: (1) the private cost to Y of inputs (M) will depend on their marginal revenue
product for X (the product of their marginal physical product in
terms of X and the average mar_ginal revenue X receives for the
goods in question - MRPM = (MPPmJ (MRx)); (2) the allocative cost to Y of using these resources will equal their marginal
allocative product in X's hands (the allocative value of the sacrificed units of X = MLP1.uc, = MPP.Mx (MLVx) = MPPx(Px)
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since the marginal allocative value of X will normally27 equal
Px); and (3) Px will exceed MRx whenever X's price is supracompetitive (unless X engages in perfect price discrimination
down to the price level in question). Obviously, other things
being equal, from the perspective of allocative efficiency, this
divergence between the private and allocative cost of Y's bidding resources away from X will distort all of Y's choices that
affect his purchases of resources that X would otherwise use.
Thus, since the marginal cost to Y of producing marginal units
of his product with X's resources will be less than the allocative
cost of his doing so, X's supracompetitive pricing will tend,
ceteris paribus, to cause Y to produce too many units of his product. Similarly, since the cost to Y of using X's resources to create
a new QV investment or to take advantage of such an investment
by producing units of the new product will be less than the allocative cost of his doing so, X's supracompetitive pricing will tend,
ceteris paribus, to induce Y to introduce too many product variants or to operate too many outlets. Finally, since the private
savings Y can achieve by discovering a new cost-reducing production technique that will free additional resources for uses by X
will be less than the allocative savings he thereby achieves, X's
supracompetitive pricing may tend, ceteris paribus, to induce Y
to do too little production-process research; conversely, since the
private cost to Y of taking resources from X to do such research
will be less than the allocative cost of his doing so, X's supracompetitive pricing may also tend, ceteris paribus, to induce Y to do
too much research. Having seen how supracompetitive pricing
can misallocate resources, we can analyze Bork's method for predicting the allocative efficiency of any business conduct or antitrust doctrine.
2. Bork's Two Predictive Premises

Bork's allocative efficiency analysis has two premises: (1)
any tendency a practice may have to decrease (increase) the unit
output of a given product will almost always worsen (improve)
relative unit output (RUO) allocation, and (2) privately profitable changes in a seller's product-service package will generally
also be allocatively efficient. The first of these premises is in-·
correct, and the second ignores the most important issues raised
27. The marginal allocative value of any given product is equal to its actual dollar
value to its actual consumer plus any external benefits or minus any external costs his
consumption of this good generates. Hence, MLVx = Px if the relevant buyer is a nonmonopsonistic consumer sovereign and his consumption ofX does not generate any externalities.
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by the ability of antitrust policy to affect the set of product types
offered by the economy.
Bork recognizes that the general theory of second best at
least calls the first premise into question. He responds to second
best in three ways. 28 First, he dismisses the theory's relevance by
arguing that the present antitrust laws do not authorize the
courts to consider second best. Although I agree with this contention, it does not justify Bork's ignoring the theory's implications,
since much of his book niakes an ultimate policy case for antitrust
regulation. Second, Bork tries to justify ignoring second best by
arguing that the theory does not in itself indicate the probability
that an anti-competitive event will improve resource allocation.
Indeed, Bork says second best demonstrates only the possibility
of such a result. Although the basic theory of second best obviously cannot by itself generate probabilities for specific cases,
it is more useful than Bork seems willing to concede: in particular, basic second-best theory demonstrates that, unless one can
devise an argument to the contrary, reductions in competition (or
in Pareto imperfections in general) must be considered as likely
to decrease as to increase RUO allocation (or resource misallocation in general). Fortunately, as I have argued elsewhere29 and will
suggest below, one can develop operational arguments that indicate when anti-competitive events will be likely to misallocate
resources in our worse-than-second-best world. Third, Bork tries
to handle second best by asserting that second-best arguments
require one to make "judgments in gross" and "call for the end
of antitrust policy." 30 Neither response is adequate. The first is
irrelevant. As Bork himself often repeats, the cost and inaccessibility of relevant data mean that economic policy decisions must
usually be based on judgments in gross. The second is both incorrect and irrelevant. It is incorrect because, as we shall see, even
in our worse-than-second-best world various allocative arguments
can be devised to support a general policy favoring price competition (and further arguments can be devised to support such policies in - roughly speaking - atypically monopolistic industries).
28. See R. BoRI<, supra note 1, at 113-14.
29. See Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic Policy Analysis in Our
Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Critique of the Chicago Approach to
the Study of Law and Economic,s, 1975 WIS. L. REv. 950 [hereinafter cited as Second
Best]; Markovits, The Causes and Policy Significance of Pareto Resource Misallocation:
A Checklist for Micro-Economic Policy Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Checklist].
30. R. BoRI<, supra note 1, at 114.
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It is irrelevant because one cannot ignore an argument simply
because its implications are devastating.
Unfortunately, although I do not think that second best destroys the case for pro-price competition policies, it does destroy
Bork's initial premise that any conduct that decreases (increases)
the relevant actor's unit output will increase (decrease) RUO
misallocation (or can reasonably be assumed to do so). Diagram
1 illustrates my analysis. It contains three curves. MCx indicates
the private marginal cost the producer of product X must incur
to produce successive units of his product. MLVx indicates the
marginal allocative value of X - the actual dollar value of successive units of X to their actual consumers plus or minus any
external benefits or costs generated by their consumption of units
of X. Our discussion will make the neutral assumption that
MLVx = DDx, the demand curve for X - which indicates the
price for which successive units of X could be sold. Finally, Diagram 1 also contains a marginal allocative cost curve for X
(MLCx), which indicates the allocative value of the units of those
goods Y that would be produced if the marginal unit of X were
not. By definition, X's optimal output will be determined by the
intersection of MLVx = DDx and MLCx. while X's competitive
output (the output - OA - that will result if X's price equals
its marginal cost - AE) will be determined by the intersection
of MLVx = DDx and MCx. Therefore, X's optimal output will
coincide with its competitive output if MLCx equals MCx. Thus,
so long as X's initial price is not below its marginal cost, the
assumption that MLCx equals MCx will assure Bork's conclusion
that any event that reduces output will increase RUO misallocation. For example, if MLCx equalled MCx, an event that reduced
X's output from OB to OC (by raising its price from BF to CG)
would cause an additional FIJG in resource misallocation. But
unfortunately, as we have seen, where the resources used to produce X would otherwise be used to produce some other good Y
whose price exceeds its marginal cost, MLC-.g: will exceed MCx.
Correlatively, X's allocatively optimal output (which is determined by the intersection of MLCx and MLVx) will be lower
than the output at which MCx and DDx intersect - OD in
Diagram 1. Obviously, given this fact, an event that reduces X's
output below the level at which MCx and DDx intersect may
improve, not worsen RUO allocation by bringing X's output
closer to its allocatively optimal level. Thus, in Diagram 1, an
event that reduces X's output by raising its price from BF to CG
would improve RUO allocation by MLFG. In general, an event
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that reduces X's output by raising X's price will not increase
RUO misallocation unless it increases the absolute difference
between the P/MC ratios of X and Y. 31 Clearly, then, so long as
we look at material goods and services rather than leisure, there
is no general reason to believe that unit-output-reducing events
will increase the gap between the relevant product's actual and
optimal outputs (that price-increasing events in X will increase
the gap between X's and Y's P/MC ratios). Hence, Bork's premise that a unit-output-decreasing event will increase RUO misallocation must be rejected in our worse-than-second-best world.
$

DIAGRAM 1

31. At least, this result occurs ifwe assume that the total amount ofRUO misallocation between X and Y increases with the amount by which such allocation would be
improved by the production of one additional unit of the under-produced good (the marginal misallocation between X and Y). Thus, if we assume that Xis under-produced and
that all Pareto imperfections other than imperfect competition can be ignored, this
marginal misallocation will equal MLVx - MLCx = MLVx - MRTv/x(MLV'i) = P.x (MCx/MCv) Pv = MCx (Px/MCx - Py'/MCy). Since most of the events with which we
are concerned will not" affect MCx (which appears to be constant in most industries
over significant variations in output), the effect of an event on the marginal RUO misallocation between X and Y will generally depend on its impact on the absolute differencebetween their P/MC ratios. (A more sophisticated analysis would have to reflect the
P/MC ratios and relative importance of X's and Y's complements.)
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Let us turn now to Bork's second premise - that it will be
allocatively efficient for a firm to introduce any product type it
finds profitable. There are three problems with this premise.
First, even if, like Bork, we focus on a firm's decision to produce
one product variant rather than another, and even if we assume
that the new product type is no more expensive than its predecessor, a privately profitable product shift may be allocatively inefficient. Such a shift might misallocate resources - i.e., might
cause intra-industry QV investment misallocation - if the production or consumption of the new product generates more externalities, if its sale generates less consumer surplus, or if it is
produced with resources that would otherwise be used to increase
the unit output of goods that are priced more monopolistically
than the goods-that were produced with the resources released
from the production of its predecessor. Admittedly, however,
given the cost of obtaining the relevant data, the absence of any
systemic bias favoring the substitution of such new products, and
the low probability that such differences in externalities, consumer sovereignty, or factor market competitors would cause
such misallocation, Bork's presumption probably makes good
policy sense in the situation described.
Unfortunately, the second problem with Bork's presumption
is far more serious. If the new product variant costs more to
produce than its predecessor, there probably is a systemic bias
favoring its introduction - i.e., a systemic tendency to misallocate resources by substituting more expensive for less expensive
product variants. In brief, this follows from our conclusion that
the private cost of the additional resources used to produce the
more expensive variant will be less than their allocative cost to
the extent that they are withdrawn from the production of goods
whose prices exceed their marginal costs. Although one can debate the practicabi~ity of using the antitrust laws (or tax laws) to
prevent such misallocation, Bork's presumption is, in this context, problematic.
Third, and finally, I am positive that Bork's presumption
should not be applied to situations in which sellers are introducing additional product variants, capacity, or distributive outlets
rather than substituting new ones for old. In fact, Bork - like
virtually all economists - never asks whether antitrust affects
the extent to which our economy generates quantity-vs.-QV investment misallocation and inter-industry QV investment misallocation. As I have argued elsewhere in some detail and will suggest in a moment, these two types of misallocation are probably
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both more substantial and more remediable than the kinds of
relative unit output (RUO) misallocations on which Bork and
virtually all other contemporary economists focus. At a minimum, the distortions that produce such misallocations would
make me suspect that an additional product variant would probably be misallocative even if privately profitable ~ particularly
if {speaking roughly) the new variant competed primarily against
products with atypically high P/MC ratios.
In short, neither of the two premises on which Bork bases his
allocative efficiency predictions is satisfactory. The first is simply
incorrect, and the second is both incorrect and too restricted in
its coverage.
3. Antitrust, Second Best, and RUO Misallocation
As I have already suggested, Bork appears to fear that on my
interpretation second best would preclude an allocative efficiency
rationale for antitrust. I suspect Bork's fears would be justified
if, as he implicitly assumes, antitrust could not improve top-level
allocation by changing the amount of product variety, distributive variety, and speed of service various industries and the economy as a whole offer.
To see why, let us analyze the ability of an anti-price-fixing
statute to improve RUO allocation. Since, as we have seen, an
individual price fix in X will worsen inter-industry RUO allocation only if it increases the difference between Px/MCx and its
weighted average counterpart for X's competitor Y, there is no
particular reason to suppose that a universal prohibition of price
fixing would improve inter-industry RUO allocation. Moreover, it
may not even be possible to devise a more selective price-fixing
statute that would improve inter-industry RUO allocation. Admittedly, since the average P/MC ratio of the distant competitors
of any product probably equals the average P/MC ratio in the
economy, one might argue for prohibitions of price fixing by firms
with higher-than-average P/MC ratios by pointing out such a
rule's tendency to improve RUO allocation among distant competitors. However, I doubt that many resources flow between such
distant competitors. Moreover, although the RUO resource flows
among moderately close competitors are clearly much larger, I
doubt that they support the kind of crudely selective policy now
under consideration. Thus, if - as I assume - products that are
often well-placed to obtain the patronage of the same buyers tend
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to have similar P/MC ratios, 32 prohibitions of price fixing by firms
with higher-than-average P/MC ratios would not be likely to improve RUO allocation by increasing the deterred price fixers' unit
outputs and decreasing their moderately close competitors' (by
reducing the former's P/MC ratios to levels that are closer to the
latters'). Hence, I doubt that one could develop a strong allocative case for this kind of crudely selective price-fixing prohibition
if such a policy could not affect the set of product types produced.
Nor could one make a strong RUO allocation case for more
refined, selective policies that prohibited price fixing by firms
whose P/MC ratios are higher than their moderately close competitors'. At least, this conclusion is implied by my assumption
that close competitors tend to have similar P/MC ratios. This
assumption is critical because it suggests both (1) that there is
not much RUO misallocation among moderately close competitors in the first place and (2) that refined and costly data would
be needed to determine whether a given prohibition would be
likely to reduce the absolute difference between the relevant
P/MC ratios. Accordingly, if antitrust could increase allocative
efficiency only by improving inter-industry RUO allocation, one
would be hard put to establish an allocative rationale for prohibitions of price fixing. In second-best language, this conclusion
would be attributed to the fact that the major Pareto imperfections that are relevant for the analysis ofRUO misallocation (the
economy's various supracompetitive prices) are offseting and
my assumption that the offsets in question are relatively perfect.
Admittedly, even if antitrust could not improve resource allocation by changing the set of products produced, one might still
base an allocative rationale for price-fixing prohibitions on their
tendency (1) to reduce the undercutting and retaliation that can
cause intra-industry RUO allocation, (2) to improve labor-leisure
allocation, (3) to redistribute income in a more allocatively efficient direction, (4) to decrease present-vs.-future consumption
misallocation, (5) to reduce the kind of production-optimum
misallocation caused by underinvestment in production-process
research, and perhaps (6) to reduce total transaction costs.
32. There are several reasons to believe in such a correlation: (1) since goods that are
competitive will tend to be differentiated to similar degrees, buyers who favor them may
tend to have similar preferences for them over their closest competitor (so that their
producers enjoy similar BCAs); (2) since goods that are competitive will tend to be distributed in similar fashions, their industries may be similarly "concentrated" (so that their
producers are similarly placed to contrive oligopolistic margins). Although obvious
counterexamples can be posed (oil and coal), I do believe that such a correlation exists.
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However, I doubt the prospects for justifying price-fixing
statutes in this way. 33
Obviously, this analysis also speaks to antitrust's ability to
improve resource allocation by prohibiting anti-competitive
mergers. In fact, our previous conclusions apply with but one
qualification: since even anti-competitive mergers may reduce
the merger partners' fixed and marginal costs, the prospects for
an allocative rationale for horizontal mergers are weaker than
those for price-fixing prohibitions.34
In short, since MC does not equal MLC in our worse-thansecond-best world, the prospects for developing an allocative rationale for various kinds of pro-price-competition policies would
not be good if such regulations could not affect the amount of
resources devoted to increasing quality and variety in various
industries and in the economy as a whole. Although this conclusion is consistent with Bork's horizontal-merger policy recom33. For a discussion of all these points, see Checklist, supra note 29.
34. Since Professor Bork bases his conclusions about the desirability of prohibiting
horizontal mergers on Oliver Williamson's welfare trade-off analysis of a price-increasing,
cost-reducing horizontal merger, it may be useful to illustrate the relevance of second best
by examining its significance for the Williamson analysis. See R. BoRK, supra note 1, at
107-10 (summarizing Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare
Tradeoff, 58 AM. EcoN. REV. 18 (1968)). Diagram A has been devised to illustrate our
analysis of the kind of event on which Williamson focused: a horizontal merger in industry
X that raised the price of X from AG to BH and reduced its output from OA to OB (and
thereby increased the output of some competitive good Y) while decreasing the marginal
cost of producing X from MC, to MC, (from OD to OC). According to Williamson, the
allocative efficiency of such a horizontal merger will depend on whether the misallocation
he associates with the reduction in X's output and increase in Y's is outweighed by the
allocative efficiencies he associates with the reduced private cost of producing X. At least
if we focus on the supracompetitive character of most goods' prices, second best will cut
against antitrust intervention in Williamson's calculus both by reducing the RUO misallocation such an output-reducing merger is likely to produce and by increasing the allocative
value of the private cost reductions it effectuates. Thus, since Williamson assumes that
MLC = MC, he argues that the merger portrayed in Diagram A would cause HGMK in
RUO misallocation if it did not generate any efficiencies. As we have seen, however, since
MLC will exceed MC where Py exceeds MCv, the merger-induced reduction in X's output
from OA to OB may not have such a negative impact on RUO allocation. In fact, on the
assumptions manifest in Diagram A's construction of MLC, > MC, , the lost units of X's
output would actually have been associated with RUO misallocation of JIGH pre-merger
- i.e. the merger-induced reduction in X's input will improve RUO allocation by JIGH.
Moreover, second best also suggests that Williamson has underestimated the allocative
value of the cost reductions generated by such mergers. Once more, Williamson's results
are distorted by his assumption that MC equals MLC. In fact, however, as we have seen,
where Py exceeds MCy, a given private cost reduction that enables X to free some resources for use by Y will generate an even larger allocative gain - i.e., MLC, will exceed
MLC, by more than MC, exceeds MC,. Thus, in Diagram A, MLC, - MLC; = OF OE exceeds MC,- MQ, = OD- OC- i.e., the allocative savings, FJRE, that the merger
will generate exceed the private savings, DKLC.
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mendation, it does undercut his strong support of anti-pricefixing legislation. In fact, however, as we shall now see, in our
monopolistically competitive world in which the amount of product differentiation, distributive differentiation, and speed of
service can be affected by antitrust policies, it is possible to
develop an allocative rationale for selective or indeed even
universal pro-price-competition policies by focusing on their
ability to influence the amount of QV investment in various
industries and the economy as a whole.
4. Second Best, Pro-Price-Competition Policies, and QV Investment Misallocation

This section will explain why it should be possible to devise pro-price-competition policies that will increase allocative
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efficiency by affecting the amount of resources allocated to
various QV investment uses both in particular sections of the
economy and in the economy as a whole. It will begin by analyzing why second best does not preclude such grand conclusions
where QV investment misallocation is concerned. As we saw,
second best is particularly damaging to the RUO case for antitrust interventions because where such misallocation is concerned the relevant imperfections in price competition not only
are offsetting but probably tend to be quite perfectly offsetting.
As we shall see, however, the imperfections in price competition
that are relevant for inter-industry QV investment misallocation
are far less perfectly offsetting than their counterparts for RUO
allocation (among moderately close competitors) while the imperfections in price competitjon that are relevant for quantityvs.-QV investment misallocation are actually compounding.
Let us examine each of these relationships in turn. Obviously the imperfections in price competition that are relevant
for RUO misallocation are those that relate to the two products-say X and Y-between which consumers choose. As we
have seen, these imperfections will have offsetting effects in relation to RUO misallocation. Thus, since Y's supracompetitive
price reduces X's optimal output below the volume at which DDx
= MCx by raising MLCx above MCx, it will offset what would
otherwise be the tendency of X's supracompetitive price to cause
X to be under-produced. Moreover, as we saw, since most unitoutput flows probably take place between close competitors and
since close competitors probably tend to have similar P/MC ratios, the offsets will probably often be close to perfect.
By way of contrast, although the effects of the supracompetitive prices that are relevant for inter-industry QV investment
misallocation are offsetting, they are not likely to be so perfectly
offsetting. The supracompetitive prices that are relevant for
inter-industry QV investment misallocation (say between industries X and A) are the prices that would be charged by the product market rivals Xl ... N and Al ... N of the marginal QV
investors (X* ·and A*) in the two industries. This relationship
reflects the fact that X* and A* either will take or can be treated
as if they will take the resources they use to produce their new
products from those rivals whose former customers their new
products will obtain. Thus, since X* will take most of his customers from Xl ... N, Xl ... N's supracompetitive prices will
artificially inflate the profits X* can make through using this QV
investment in X, rather than abandoning it, by artificially deflat-
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ing the private cost to X* of the unit-output-increasing resources
he must combine with his QV investment to produce units of his
variant X*. On the other hand, since by assumption the cost to
X* of creating his QV investment will equal the profits A* could
realize by using his QV investment (the value of the alternative
QV investment to A*), the same argument implies that Al . . .
Ns supracompetitive prices will artificially deflate X*'s incentive
to make a QV investment by artificially inflating the profits A*
can make by using his alternative QV investment (by artificially
deflating the cost to A* of the unit-output-producing resources he
would combine with his QV investment). Hence, like their RUO
counterparts, the supracompetitive prices that are relevant for
inter-industry QV investment misallocation will also tend to produce offsetting distortions. However, the offsets in question are
likely to be far less perfect in this QV investment context. In part,
this conclusion reflects the fact that X* and A* are far less likely
to be close competitors than X and Y - that inter-industry QV
investment flows are not likely to take place between close competitors, who tend to have similar P/MC ratios. To see why, note
that although an event that increases the unit output of steel
(e.g., a reduction in ~teel's price) is likely to reduce the unit
output of its close competitor aluminum, an event that increases
QV investment (capacity) in steel (e.g., a price increase in steel)
is likely to increase QV investment in aluminum as well (since an
increase in steel's price will tend to increase profits in the
aluminum industry). In part, however, this conclusion reflects
the fact that the net affect of Xl . .. Na and Al . .• . N's_supracompetitive prices on X*'s QV investment decision will depend
not only on the respective P/MC ratios but also on the effective
tax rate applied to business earnings in the two industries and the
sales to QV investment ratios for X* and A* .35 This conclusion
also reflects the fact that inter-industry QV investment allocations can be caused by a large number of other factors that distort individually the profits any given industry's marginal QV
35. If we ignore externalities, factor taxes, and other market imperfections, the distortions affecting the use of the marginal QV investqient in ipdustry X, (DU/QV~),.are
equal to (1-T][((P-MC]/P)(PQ/QV)-CS/QV-(M+O)iWQV]-T(LV/QV) where T stands
for the effective tax rate applied to the profits generated by the marginal QV investment
in X, (P - MC)/P stands for the average (P - MC)/P ratio of those goods that lose sales to
the new product (roughly the ratio in industry X), PQ stands for X's marginal QV
investor's sales (price times quantity), QV stands for the size of his QV investment, CS
stands for the consumer surplus the sale of his new product will generate, (M + 0) l:H.'
stands for the monopolistic or oligopolistic investment disincentives facing X's marginal
QV investor, and LV stands for the allocative value of the marginal QV investment in X.
For a fuller discussion, see Second Best, supra note 29, at 1015-29.
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investors would realize by using his QV investment. Obviously,
these results imply that inter-industry QV investment may be
both more substantial and more detectable than its RUO counterpart. In- particular, since marginal QV investors in industry X
will probably withdraw resources from QV investment uses in
many industries that have average distortions, industry X will
tend to have relatively too much (little) QV investment if the
rate of return its marginal QV investors can realize by using
their completed QV investments is artificially inflated more
(less) than its weighted-average counterpart in the economy as.a
whole. Although this conclusion does not provide a rationale for
a universal pro-price-competition policy, it does support a
crudely selective policy of increasing price competition in industries in which the profitability of using a QV investment is artificially inflated to a greater-than-average extent (in which DU/QV
is greater than average).
Moreover, the supracompetitive prices that are relevant for
quantity-vs.-QV investment misallocation actually produce compounding effects. The prices that are relevant in this context are
those charged by the product market rivals Xl .· . . N of the
marginal QV investor X* and those charged by X*'s factormarket rival B (whose unit output will be reduced if X* creates
his QV investment). As we have seen, Xl ... Ns supracompetitive prices will tend to induce X* to make a QV investment by
artificially inflating the profits he can make by using his completed QV investment (e.g., by producing units of his newly designed and promoted product) while B's supracompetitive price
will tend to induce X* to create a QV investment (to design and
promote a new product) by artificially reducing the cost he has
to incur to do so (by reducing the private cost of X*'s bidding the
necessary resources away from B below the allocative cost of his
doing so). Since, then, all the relevant supracompetitive prices
artificially inflate the profitability of using resources to create QV
investments, our analysis implies both (1) that too much of the
economy's resources are allocated to QV investments and (2) that
pro-price-competition policies will virtually always increase allocative efficiency by reducing the resources allocated to QV investment.
In short, in my opinion, Bork's failure to deal with monopolistic competition has caused him to ignore the best allocative
arguments for universal or crudely selective pro-pricecompetition policies in our worse-than-second-best world. But
though I do believe that antitrust policies can be justified in
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terms of their effects on QV investment, this rationale leads to
somewhat nontraditional policy conclusions. For example, the
preceding analysis implies (1) that the desirability of a given
intervention will increase with DU/QV rather than with P/MC
and (2) that pro-QV-investment competition policies may be allocatively undesirable since they will always exacerbate quantityvs.-QV investment allocation by increasing QV investment and
will normally worsen inter-industry QV investment allocation as
well (since they will tend to apply primarily in industries in which
DU/QV is higher than average). However, although one might
also support such a policy for purely distributive reasons, I am
convinced that a well-designed antitrust policy can be justified
by its impact on allocative efficiency in· our worse-than-secondbest world.
C. Predatory and Oligopolistic Pricing
This section will analyze Bork's conclusions about the importance of predatory and oligopolistic pricing. Bork argues that
predatory and oligopolistic pricing would be unprofitable even if
they were not illegal; I believe that both are far more profitable
than Bork suggests. At least in part, our disagreement derives
from my rejection of two assumptions Bork has implicitly
adopted: (1) the pre-monopolistic competition assumption that
all firms that are well-placed to obtain the patronage of any
buyer will be equally well-placed to obtain his patronage and
(2) the assumption that any seller who wishes to engage in predatory price-cutting or to react to his rivals' responses to his oligopolistic price must do so across the board - i.e., by changing the
price he charges all the customers with whom he deals. 36
In predatory pricing, a seller X lowers his prices sufficiently
to force a rival victim V to exit in circumstances in which the
relevant price reductions would not have been profitable but for
their tendency to drive V out of business. Bork stresses that predatory price wars are at least in part wars of attrition won by the
last firm to use all its reserves. Since Bork assumes that each
firm's reserves will be proportionate to its market share, he concludes that the successful predator must inflict proportionately
more losses on his victim (relative to their respective sizes) than
36. Professor Bork does not realize the extent to which his conclusions would be
altered in an individualized pricing world if nonmarginal cost pricing were introduced. See
R. BORK, supra note 1, at 149.
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on himself. Realistically assuming that the predator will tend to
be larger than its victim, Bork shows that.under certain conditions, predation will not be profitable because the predator will
bear proportionately more costs than his smaller victim. 37 Bork's
argument presumes that the predator must reduce his prices
across the board and that his rivals? prices would equal their
marginal costs in the absence of predation - i.e., that the
predator's victims would enjoy neither BCAs nor OMs (on their
marginal sales) in the absence of predation. Unfortunately,
when these conditions are not fulfilled, large predators can often
inflict the necessary harm on their victims at an absolutely lower
and not just a proportionately lower cost to themselves. To see
why, suppose (1) X can lower his price selectively to his victim's
(V's) customers and (2) Venjoys significant BCAs. In this case,
X can take away each of V's customers whom Xis second-bestplaced to serve at a direct cost38 of one cent39 while X can take
away those of V's customers for whom he is not V's closest rival
at a cost of one cent plus the amount by which X is worse-thansecond-best placed. 40 On the other hand, the harm X can inflict
on V for stealing one of V's customers equals the BCA V enjoyed
in his relations with that customer. 41
Thus, a seller who is often one of the best-placed competitors
of a rival who enjoys significant competitive advantages may be
able to deprive his victim of substantial and critical42 profits relaI

37. See id. at 147-55.
38. I will ignore the contextual costs of various pricing strategies throughout this
section.
39. Assume, for example, that there are no contextual costs, that V's and X's marginal costs are both one dollar, and that Venjoys a buyer preference advantage often cents
in relation to the relevant customer Y. If X is V's closest rival, he will be able to steal Y
with a price that is eleven cents below X's HNOP of $1.10 - i.e., with a 99¢ price that is
one cent below his own marginal costs.
40. Thus, if in the above example Z was V's closest competitor, X also had one dollar
cost, but V had a twelve cent buyer preference advantage over X, then X could not steal
Y without offering him a price of 97¢ (thirteen cents below V's HNOP and three cents
below X's own marginal cost).
41. In our example, this is the ten cent profit V would have realized at his HNOP.
The above analysis assumes that Vis not charging oligopolistic prices.
42. I should note that the fact that the victim enjoys large BCAs (so that the predator's harm inflicted to cost incurred ratio will be relatively high for some levels of harm
inflicted) does not imply that the predator will have to inflict a great deal of harm to drive
his victim V out in the long run. Ceteris paribus, victims will exit if they realize subnormal
returns on their operations. Thus, if V expects predation to continue indefinitely, the
critical amount of profits will be the amount of supranormal profits he realized prepredation: obviously, the sum of a number of large BCAs may still not constitute a large
amount of supranormal profits on V's investment. I should also note that the speed with
which such a V will exit will also depend on how soon he will have to renew his plant and
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tively cheaply. 43 Hence, predatory pricing may be profitable, at
least where (1) the presence of the predator's victim substantially
reduces the predator's profits44 and either (2) the victim is better
placed to operate in the market than any potential competitor
would be to enter the market or any other established firm would
be to expand its QV investments45 or (3) the victim is substantially more harmful to the predator than his replacement seems
likely to be. 48
Bork also believes that oligopolistic pricing will not take
place without overt collusion and that overt collusion among
oligopolists frequently breaks down.'7 Accordingly, although favoring vigorous attacks on price fixes when they are discovered,
he denies that deconcentration policies or highly restrictive
merger rules can be justified by their effect on oligopolistic pricing. Although these positions are consistent with his analysis of
the cost of predation, 48 Bork bases them primarily on (1) various
inadequacies he sees in traditional oligopolistic price theory, (2)
the absence of empirical evidence supporting the view that traditional oligopolies practice oligopolistic pricing, and (3) various
types of empirical evidence gleaned from antitrust cases. Neither
Bork's arguments nor his conclusion are persuasive to me; natural, tacitly contrived, and overtly contrived oligopolistic pricing
are all greater problems than Professor Bork supposes.
equipment and how much he can realize by selling to alternative users. (Obviously, however, X will not benefit if V sells out to someone who will simply duplicate V's operations.)
43. I.e., the seller will tend to have a harm to cost ratio for effective retaliation that
is far above one. Obviously, the predator will minimize the cost of his retaliation by
stealing those customers in relation to whom this harm to cost ratio is highest.
44. E.g., where the victim was often the predator's closest competitor by a substantial
amount.
45. I.e., the victim's QV investment will not be replaced: since in our monopolistically competitive world, a new entrant or expanding established firm may not be able to
recreate or match the established victim's managerial team, product reputation, or distributive system, ease of entry will not always be "symmetrical with ease of exit," as Bork
supposes. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 153.
46. Admittedly, Professor Bork's skepticism about the significance of predatory pricing largely reflects the paucity of documented cases of such behavior and his doubts about
the feasibility of distinguishing predatory behavior from legitimate aggressive price competition. See id. at 154-55.
47. See id. at 181.
48. Which implies that oligopolistic pricers who had to rely on retaliation to secure
their rival's cooperation would have to incur prohibitive costs to do so.
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Bork's theoretical attack on oligopoly theory focuses on its
prediction that oligopolists will substitute a high rate of product
differentiation for price competition. 49 Bork argues that
"[i]deally, from the oligopolists' point of view, products should
be identical" 50 and that "[c]onventional oligopoly theory ought
to predict a lessening of product competition, just as it predicts
a lessening of price competition. 51 He then attacks such a reformed oligopoly theory by pointing out that it cannot account for
the substantial product rivalry often found in oligopolistic markets. However, maximizing oligopolists would not produce identical products, and product rivalry (QV investment competition)
might well coexist with oligopolistic pricing. Thus, although
product standardization may facilitate oligopolistic pricing, it
will probably not be ideal from the oligopolists' perspective, since
where consumers value diversity, standardization will reduce the
profits the oligopolists' price cooperation can generate. Moreover,
product rivalry (QV investment competition) may be intense
where oligopolistic pricing is being practiced, since the presence
of effectiye potential competitors may prevent the established
firms from restricting QV investment in their markets without
eliminating their incentives or ability to secure oligopolistic margins. 52 Hence, oligopolistic price theory would not be disconfirmed
by active product and locational rivalry in conventional oligopolistic markets - i.e., in concentrated markets, in which relatively
few sellers have very high market shares. As we shall see, a more
sophisticated oligopolistic price theory - one taking monopolistic competition into account - would not in any case suggest a
strong or highly significant cross-market correlation between the
incidence of oligopolistic pricing and the concentration of traditionally defined markets.
Obviously, this last conclusion also undercuts any possible
significance of the failure of the various rate of return versus
concentration studies to produce consistent, strong correlations.
Such concentration rate of return studies would have no significance even if oligopolistic price theory did suggest such a correlation between market price structure and oligopolistic margins,
for, in our monopolistic competitive world, rates of return will
49. Id. at 187.
50. Id. at 188.
51. Id. at 187.
· 52. For a fuller discussion of the differences between the determinants of price and
QV investment competition, see Horizontal Mergers, supra note 11, at 687 n.186.
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depend on the intensity of QV investment competition, which
will not correlate well with the profitability of oligopolistic pricing. 53 Although, obviously, I sympathize with Professor Bork's
desire for evidence, I doubt we can test oligopolistic price theory
in the real world. Thus, even if oligopolistic pricing theory did
imply a correlation between concentration and OMs, we could
not test it in the other "straightforward" way that has been tried
- viz., by doing a cross-industry study of the relationship between (P-MC) and concentration - for increases in concentration would probably lead to increases in (P-MC) even if they did
not raise OMs (since they would be associated with increases in
BCAs in any case). In the end, then, one's estimates of the importance of oligopolistic pricing may have to depend both on one's
experience and on the results of a theoretical analysis of the profitability of such pricing.
Professor Bork's conclusions that oligopolistic pricing cannot
occur unless it is overtly contrived are based on "[e]vidence
supplied by antitrust cases" that "(1) a large price drop occurs
when even one firm appears to challenge an established monopolist; (2) oligopolists are frequently discovered in overt collusion;
and (3) even overt collusion among oligopolists frequently breaks
down . . . ." 54 For several reasons, I find this evidence unpersuasive: (1) the type of one-firm challenge Bork describes would
clearly decrease prices by reducing BCAs even if it did not affect
OMs and (2) the existence of numerous instances of overt and
unsuccessful collusion is not inconsistent with the existence of
many more cases of successful oligopolistic pricing of all sorts
(natural, tacitly contrived, and overtly contrived). Although my
experience is much more limited than Professor Bork's, it does
suggest much more pessimistic conclusions than his.
My belief in the empirical importance of oligopolistic pricing
primarily reflects my theoretical analysis of the profitability of
such pricing. In fact, my analysis suggests that in some circumstances, sellers can obtain oligopolistic margins without incurring
any costs. Thus, sellers who can rely on the fact that they would
find it possible and directly profitable to beat any undercutting
53. For an elaboration of this point, see Markovits, A Response to Professor Posner,
28 STAN. L. REV. 919, 943-44 (1976). Bork attributes high rates of return to superior
efficiency. See R. BoRK, supra note 1, at 181. However, if the number of efficient firms
that did not face high (1r 0 + R) barriers was sufficient to preclude each from confronting
(M + 0) disincentives, their own QV investment competition would prevent them from
realizing supranorrnal returns.
54. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 181.
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offer a rival chose to make to their customers may not need to
deter their rivals from undercutting by incurring the cost of retaliating against their undercutters or reciprocating to their cooperative rivals. In particular, in individualized pricing contexts, sellers will be able to practice oligopolistic pricing naturally whenever (1) the strategic and mechanical cost55 of changing their
initial bid is less than the profits they would have realized ab
initio at the reduced price and (2) buyers are sufficiently likely
to give their best-placed suppliers a chance to rebid to make their
second-best-placed suppliers reluctant to incur the mechanical
and strategic costs of calculating and communicating an underbid. 56
55. In my terminology, the strategic costs of such a price change are the costs it generates for a seller by angering customers who already have bought his product at the recently announced higher price (and who therefore may refuse to buy the product in the
future, irrational as that may seem, or may make negative statements about the product's
general quality to other potential buyers) and/or by inducing customers to respond to
any price changes he should effectuate in the future by delaying their purchases in the
expectation that, in time, these prices also will be reduced. The mechanical costs of
changing a newly announced price are the cost of communicating the change to one's
sales organization as well as the cost of physically retagging the goods or changing some
associated advertising. I should note that in across-the-board pricing contexts a seller
may reduce both the strategic and mechanical costs of such price changes by making premature price announcements, which will enable him to change his originally announced
price before he has tagged his products or made any sales if his rivals do not lock themselves into satisfactory price responses.
56. Thus, the ability of a seller to obtain a natural OM will increase with the costs
its closest rival has to incur to calculate and make its bid. I should note that the probability that a given buyer will give his best-placed supplier an opportunity to beat an underbid
may be inversely related to the size of the OM this supplier has tried to obtain (or more
directly to the extent to which the underbid is more attractive than the original offer the
buyer received from his best-placed supplier). This inverse relationship may occur (1)
because the extent to which the buyer's "non-rational" annoyance at his supplier's attempt to obtain an "undeserved" natural OM will increase with the size of the natural
OM the underbid reveals, (2) because the extent to which a buyer finds it strategically
useful to sacrifice short-run returns to establish his unwillingness to allow his suppliers
to abuse him by obtaining substantial natural OMs also may increase with the size of the
natural OMs sought, or (3) because buyers who obtain substantial underbids may be more
likely to conclude that their best-placed supplier has miscalculated and could not now
change his bid without incurring prohibitive strategic or mechanical costs - i.e., because
such buyers may conclude that it would not even be in their short-run interest to incur
the cost of offering their best-placed supplier the opportunity to bid again. (The buyer
will have to incur both mechanical and strategic costs to give his best-placed supplier a
chance to rebid. The mechanical costs are simply the costs of recontacting the relevant
seller. The strategic costs, which are far more important, are the losses the buyer will
sustain because of the tendency of such a move to deter his inferior suppliers from underbidding his superior suppliers in the future. Accordingly, the strategic costs a buyer will
have to incur to recontact his best-placed supplier will increase with the visibility of his
behavior and the extent to which he will engage in individualized transactions with knowledgeable partners in the future. I should also note that the ability of a seller to obtain
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Moreover, my analysis also suggests that sellers may be able
to contrive oligopolistic prices relatively cheaply even when they
cannot obtain OMs naturally. Since, as we have seen, the cost to
an individual pricer X of stealing some rival R's customer is often
far less than the resulting harm to R, X can often inflict deterrent
harm57 on a prospective undercutter R relatively cheaply. Specifically, the cost to X of such retaliation will tend to be lower the
lower R's OCAs, the more frequently X is well-placed to steal R's
customers relative to the number of times R is well-placed to steal
X's, and the greater X's ability to detect the fact that he has been
undercut and to identify his undercutter. 58 In addition, a seller
who cannot obtain OMs naturally can reduce the cost of contriving oligopolistic prices by offering to reward those rivals who do
not undercut him by not undercutting their oligopolistic prices.
Thus, at virtually no cost to him, 59 a seller X can benefit his rival
R by the size of X's competitive advantage over the third-bestplaced supplier of those of R's customers whom Xis second-bestplaced to supply. 60 Although these benefits will rarely be large
natural OMs will increase with his OCAs since the probability that a seller would not find
the strategic and mechanical cost ofreducing his initial price prohibitive will increase with
the profits he would have made had he charged the lower price originally; this probability
will increase the seller's ability to obtain a natural OM both directly and by increasing
the likelihood that the relevant buyer will give him an opportunity to rebid.)
57. In general, to deter others, the oligopolistic pricer will have to deprive the undercutters he identifies of more profits than they realized by undercutting him, since his
potential undercutters will realize that he will not always be able to detect that he has
been undercut (since he may lose customers through changes in taste that deprive him of
his best-placed position) and to identify his undercutters so that he will not always
retaliate against his undercutters.
58. The cost of retaliation affects the profitability of retaliation in two ways: first,
by affecting the losses the oligopolistic pricer has to sustain when he does have to retaliate
effectively and, second, by influencing the credibility of his threat to retaliate (and hence
the probability that he will in fact be undercut and have to retaliate) by reducing the
profitability of his carrying out his threat.
59. In a world without antitrust, the cost to X of making and fulfilling his promise
to R will equal the certainty equivalent profits he could make by undercutting R if R
charged an oligopolistic price without securing X's cooperation or if X induced R to charge
such a price and then welshed on his promise of cooperation. Since I doubt that R would
continue to charge such a price on his own if X consistently undercut him and am certain
that X could not welsh on such promises without destroying his ability to dupe his rivals,
I expect that the relevant costs are trivial.
60. Let us assume that R, X, and R's next closest rival Z could all supply some
buyer Y at a marginal cost of one dollar, but that Y had a ten cent preference for R's product over X's and a twenty cent preference for R's product over Z's. In this case, X could
enable R to raise his price from $1.10 to $1.20 without incurring a risk of undercutting.
(The text assumes that R has not secured anyone else's cooperation. Thus, if R had
already secured Z's cooperation in the above example, the value of X's cooperation would
be increased by an amount equal to Z's advantage over R's third closest competitor for
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enough to deter a rival from undercutting a large amount of oligopolistic pricing, they will often substantially reduce the retaliatory harm the oligopolistic pricer must threaten. Moreover, since
the ratio of harm inflicted to cost incurred will decline for each
successive act of retaliation, a firm's ability to reciprocate will
reduce the cost of the retaliation it must threaten by a greater
proportion than it reduces the harm it must threaten. Hence,
oligopolistic pricing may also be profitable for firms that cannot
obtain OMs naturally and who would have to incur prohibitive
costs to secure their rivals' cooperation exclusively through
threats and acts of retaliation.
Obviously, the profitability of contrived oligopolistic pricing
will also depend on many other factors. 61 Nonetheless, this analyr
sis suggests why I am not surprised by my own experience -;..
which indicates that natural and contrived OMs are far mor~
common than Bork supposes.
In short, I believe that Bork underestimates the incidence of
both predatory and oligopolistic pricing. Although such pricing
will be difficult to prove, 62 I suspect that far more resources
Y's patronage. Similarly, when X is not Y's closest competitor, his cooperation will be
valuable to R if R has already secured the cooperation of X's other superiors.)
61. Thus, the size of the most profitable contrived OM for·an individualized pricer
to seek from some buyer Yl will be inversely related to the .size of his OCA when dealing
with YI (which determines the amount of safe profits he must risk to do so) and directly
related to the sum of the OCAs he enjoys in his relations with buyers Y2 . . . N (which
affects the credibility of his threats by determining the amount of profits his retaliation
will protect).
62. Thus, the fact that a price is below marginal cost does not establish its predatory
character since such a price may be promotional- i.e., since its profitability may depend
on its ability to increase the future sales of the relevant product by increasing consumers'
experience with it. Similarly, the fact that a price exceeds marginal cost, average total
cost, or even the seller's highest nonoligopolistic price does not establish its nonpredatory
character. Thus, in an across-the-board pricing situation, a seller may charge a price
that contains a lower oligopolistic margin than he could have obtained naturally in order
to drive a rival out of business. Unfortunately, there are also no simple ways to determine
the oligopolistic character of a price (much less to determine whether an oligopolistic price
has been contrived, ob4lined naturally, or charged by mistake). More particularly, I
believe there are only three ways to determine whether particular prices are oligopolistic:
the first, straightforward (but costly) method· determines whether a particular price is
oligopolistic by computing the highest nonoligopolistic price and comparing it with the
actual price; the second, comparative method infers the existence of an OM from intertemporal or inter-regional price differences that cannot be accounted for by nonoligopolistic factors (e.g., differences in BCAs) that would affect the relationship between
the relevant HNOPs; the third, behavioral, method infers the existence of an OM from
proof of behavior that is normally associated with contrived oligopolistic pricing - such
as acts of reciprocation or retaliation. For an analysis of the inadequacy of some of the
other methods that have been proposed for identifying oligopolistic prices (such as the
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should be devoted to their detection and prevention.
D. The Competitive Impact of Horizontal Mergers
Professor Bork argues that mergers up to sixty or seventy
percent of the market will be very unlikely to reduce competition.63 "Partly as a tactical concession to current oligopoly phobia
and partly in recognition of Section 7's intended function of
tightening the Sherman Act rule," he recommends that section 7
be interpreted to make "presumptively lawful all horizontal
mergers up to market shares that would allow for other mergers
of similar size in the industry and still leave three significant
companies." 6' This section will be divided into two parts: the first
will summarize the most important ways 65 in which a horizontal
merger can affect the intensity of price and QV investment competition;66 the second will explain why predictions of the competitive impact of horizontal mergers should not be based on the kind
of market concentration and market share data on which Bork
relies - i.e., why it would be more accurate and more costeffective to predict the competitive impact of horizontal mergers
price discrimination test, excess capacity test, supranormal profit test, and straightforward price difference test), see Markovits, supra note 53, 940-49.
63. R. BoRI<, supra note 1, at 221.
64. Id. at 221-22.
65. For a more complete summary, see Horizontal Mergers, supra note 11, at 690-97.
66. In what follows, I will adopt Professor Bork's and the courts' assumption that in
normal horizontal merger cases, such an analysis should be made by comparing the
situation the merger would produce with the status quo. Admittedly, this procedure may
allow horizontal mergers that would otherwise have been replaced by more procompetitive internal growth, non-horizontal mergers, horizontal mergers, or resource releases (managerial dismissals or dividend declarations which release resources to more
pro-competitive alternative uses by others). However, in most situations, a requirement
that two merger partners show that their merger's prohibition would not have deterred
them from engaging in more pro-competitive conduct would probably be self-defeating,
given the tendency of such an approach to deter firms from engaging in any horizontal
mergers at all. Of co,urse, there are situations in which the mergers would not be likely to
be deterred - viz., where one of the MPs was a failing company or clearly would not take
full advantage of its assets without engaging in a merger. The failing company doctrine
and the Court's decision in United States v. General Dynamics, 415 U.S. 486 (1974),
probably reflect this fact. Nevertheless, it is somewhat surprising that a court that has
developed the toe-hold merger doctrine in the conglomerate area should not have created
some analogue for horizontal merger cases - though the judges' "need" for such a doctrine
has clearly been reduced by their failure to recognize the possibility that horizontal mergers that create efficiencies may actually increase competition in comparison with the
status quo. I should note that I do doubt that the Clayton Act authorizes such nonstatus
quo comparisons: doctrines like the toe-hold merger doctrine come close to imposing a
novel duty on business firms to increase competition under a statute which seems to
condemn only behavior that decreases competition in comparison with the status quo.
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through a method that does not presuppose the definition of any
relevant "markets."
1.

The Possible Competitive Impacts of Horizontal Mergers: A
Summary

This section will summarize (1) the ways a horizontal merger
that generates no static or dynamic efficiencies67 can affect price
and QV investment competition and (2) the ways any static or
dynamic efficiencies a merger does generate may affect its competitive impact. A horizontal merger that generates no efficiencies will tend to increase the BCAs, the natural OMs, and the
contrived OMs of the merger partners (MPl and MP2) by reducing the attractiveness of the rival offers against which the MPs
must compete. First, such a horizontal merger will tend to increase the MPs' BCAs to the extent that they were each other's
closest competitors for the patronage of particular buyers: in particular, such a merger will increase the best-placed MP's BCA by
an amount equal to the second-best-placed MP's advantage over
the third-best-placed suppliers of the buyers in question. Second,
by raising their BCAs, a horizontal merger will increase the_MPs'
ability to obtain OMs naturally by increasing the probability that
they will find it profitable in the short run to beat an inferior
rival's underbid. Third, a horizontal merger will increase the
MPs' contrived OMs: (1) by reducing the communication costs
they must incur to contrive an OM·(by obviating their communicating with each other and permitting both to communicate in
one act to a given rival) and by increasing the extent to which one
partner can rely on its pricing decisions to communicate implicitly its anti~competitive intentions (when one of the merger partners has a reputation that the other lacks for contriving or for
accurately assessing its position); (2) by increasing the merger
partners' ability to detect undercutting by using repeat sales records to predict the probability that any given percentage of their
customers would have defected spontaneously (by increasing the
number of customers they, serve, particularly when some rivals
might otherwise have undercut both merger partners); (3) by
67. An efficiency is said to be "static" if it does not relate specifically to the reievant
firm's ability to grow. Thus, a merger that reduced a firm's marginal cost curve would be
said to have generated a static efficiency. An efficiency is said to be "dynamic" if it relates
specifically to the firm's ability to grow. Thus, a merger that created a new firm that would
find it more profitable to introduce an additional product variant than either of its predecessors would be said to have generated a dynamic efficiency.
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increasing their ability to identify their undercutters (by eliminating one possible undercutter, by providing them with more
relevant circumstantial evidence through facilitating the pooling
of their sales records, and perhaps by enabling the merger partners to pool other sorts of information that would give them a
more accurate picture of their individual rivals' competitive positions relative to them); (4) by increasing the credibility of their
threats and promises (by enabling the merged company to take
advantage of the stronger reputation of one of its predecessors and
by increasing the actual profitability of retaliation and reciprocation); (5) by reducing the cost of the necessary rewards and punishments by enabling the merged firm to use any excess reciprocatory power either merger partner had vis-a-vis a particular
rival, by increasing each MP's reciprocatory power (where one
MP was some R's closest rival and the other MP was that R's
second-closest rival), and by enabling the merged company to use
both merger partners' products to punish a rival for undercutting
either merger partner (where the MPs face different harm inflicted to cost-incurred ratios for their marginal [last necessary]
acts of retaliation); and (6) by increasing the benefits generated
by such behavior by increasing the BCAs the merger partners
have to protect against undercutting and enabling both to profit
from any reputation that either's reciprocation or retaliation
would create.
In fact, a horizontal merger that generates no efficiencies will
also tend to increase the competitive advantages and contrived
OMs of the MPs' rivals. Thus, to the extent that the horizontal
merger increases the MPs' BCAs and OMs, it will tend to increase
their rivals' overall competitive advantages (OCAs - which include their contextqal cost advantages) by increasing the prices
the MPs charge their own customers, the discriminatory character of the prices they would have to charge the Rs' customers to
steal them, and hence the contextual costs the MPs would have
to incur to undercut their rivals. Moreover, as we have seen, any
such increase in the Rs' OCAs will also facilitate their obtaining
natural OMs. Finally, and most importantly, the MPs' horizontal
merger will increase their Rs' ability to contrive OMs in various
ways. For example, in individualized pricing situations, 08 a horizontal merger will tend to increase the contrived OMs of the
68. Although space does not permit, similar points could be developed for across-theboard pricing situations. See Horizontal Mergers, supra note 11, at 637-58.
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merger partners' rivals (1) by reducing the costs to them of making the necessary communications (by enabling such rivals to
communicate simultaneously to both merger partners); (2) by
reducing the costs they m~st incur to identify their undercutters
(by reducing by one the number of independent possibilities and
by enabling them to pool information ~bout the customers they
lost that either MP was well-placed to steal); and (3) by reducing
the cost to them of rewarding or punishing the merged firm (by
enabling them to take advantage of any excess reciprocatory
power they had in relation to one of the merger partners, by
enabling them to punish the merged company by stealing more
of one of the merger partners' customers than would otherwise
have been necessary- i.e., by spreading the MPs' defenses, and
by increasing the individual MPs' BCAs and hence vulnerability
to retaliation). Although these effects of the MP1-MP2 merger on
the competitive advantages and oligopolistic margins of their rivals would not be relevant under my reading of the Sherman Act,
they would be relevant under my interpretation of the Clayton
Act.
Horizontal mergers that do not generate efficiencies may also
affect the intensity of QV investment competition. 69 As we saw,
the intensity of QV investment competition is defined in terms
of the lower of the total (1rn + R + S + L) E + M* barriers and
disincentives facing the best-placed potential expander at the
entry-precluded expansion-barring QV investment level and the
total (1rn+ R + S + L)N barriers facing the best-placed potential
competitor at the entry-precluded QV investment level. Where
the established firms are unable to take advantage of the investment restriction opportunities the barriers to entry create i.e., where the relevant (1rn + R + S + L)E + M* is less than
the ( 1r D + R + S + L) N - a horizontal merger may reduce the
intensity of QV investment competition in four primary ways: (1)
by raising the relevant (-1r D + R) barriers where one of the MPs
was the original best-placed expander and he finds it optimal to
allocate to consolidating the merger resources that he would otherwise use for internal growth; (2) by raising the relevant L barrier where one of the MPs was the original best-placed expander
and the merger increases his vulnerability to retaliation by allowing his rivals to injure him by stealing his merger partner's customers; (3) by raising the relevant L barrier where one of the MPs'
69. For a more complete discussion of these possibilities and an analysis of some
perverse results, see id. at 680-82.
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rivals R was originally the best-placed expander and the merger
increases the MPs' ability to retaliate against R's expansion by
internalizing to the new concern the benefits MPl's retaliation
would generate for MP2 (by deterring future QV investments) and
by facilitating joint retaliation by both; and (4) by raising the
relevant M* where one of the MPs was originally the best-placed
expander and his intended expansion would reduce his partner's
returns. On the other hand, where potential competition was
effective, i.e., where the relevant ( 1r D + R + S + L)N is less than
( 1r D + R + S + L)E + M*, a horizontal merger may also decrease
QV investment competition by raising~ (by internalizing to the
new firm the benefits MPl's retaliation generates for MP2 and by
facilitating their joint retaliation).
In short, horizontal mergers that generate no efficiencies will
reduce price and QV investment competition both by internalizing to the merged firm the damage each MP's price or QV investment moves do to the other (and thereby increasing the MPs'
BCAs and M disincentives) and by facilitating oligopolistic interactions between the MPs and their Rs (and thereby increasing the
natural and contrived OMs the MPs and their Rs can obtain as
well as the L barriers the MPs and their Rs face).
'Let us now analyze the competitive significance of any efficiencies the horizontal merger might create. Most judicial discussions of such efficiencies assume that their tendency is anticompetitive70 while most academic discussions ignore their possible impact. 71 Admittedly, a horizontal merger that generates
70. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). But see Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 699 (1977).
71. For example, the Williamson trade-off analysis ignores the impact of mergergenerated efficiencies both on the prices charged to buyers the merged firm does not obtain
and on the intensity of QV investment competition. See Williamson, Economies as an
Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Trade-Off, 58 AM. EcoN. REv. 18 (1968). In part, this
failure of antitrust analysts to work through the competitive consequences of efficiencies
reflects their doubt (which Bork seems to share) about the feasibility of demonstrating
the existence of such efficiencies in a litigative context. See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 21922. In fact, if! am correct in assuming that most of the efficiencies mergers generate reflect
nonscale complementarities, problems of proof will be even worse than was previously
supposed (since engineering studies of economies of scale will be relevant). In this note, I
will propose a technique that will enable the government to make the ultimate merger
decision depend on such efficiencies without requiring judges or administrators to estimate their magnitude (although it will still be necesary for them to determine the character of the relevant efficiencies - i.e., whether they are marginal or fixed, static or dynamic).
The basic approach is familiar to all economists: a merger license fee that would
resemble in some respects a pollution tax or license. In particular, the merger fee would
be designed to guarantee the pro-competitive impact (or alternatively, the allocative
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static efficiencies may decrease QV investment and hence price
competition in the long run by inducing the exit of an established
firm or deterring the entry of a potential competitor. In particular, this will be the result if'.the efficiency-generated improvement
in the competitive position of the merged firm reduces by a critical amount the number of customers the established firm (bestplaced potential entrant) is (would be) best-placed to obtain or
the size of the average competitive advantage it enjoys when bestplaced. In general, however, the immediate pro-competitive conefficiency) of any merger whose participants were willing to pay the fee they were charged.
Unfortunately, it will be even more complicated to calculate the relevant merger fee than
to calculate the appropriate pollution tax. In this note, I can simply delineate the general
outline of the method that would have to be used. First, one would estimate the private
profitability and the competitive impact of the relevant merger on the assumption that it
would generate no efficiencies. Second, one would gather evidence on the character of the
efficiencies in order to assess the ratio of their private value to their competitive value..
To see why such information is relevant, note that a static fixed cost efficiency that will
not carry over to an expansion will have no competitive value (value to the relevant
consumers) though it will have considerable private value, while a static marginal efficiency that will affect the MPs' position primarily in their relations with customers whom
they were originally second-best-placed to serve will have far more competitive value than
private value (since it will reduce the prices these buyers pay even where the MPs do not
end up supplying them by decreasing their best-placed suppliers' OCAs). See also note
107 infra. Third, one would estimate this private value to competitive value ratio by
combining one's conclusions about the character of the efficiencies in question with other
data that are relevant for this purpose. For example, as the preceding discussion implies,
in the case of marginal static efficiencies one would want to know the relative frequency
with which the MPs were best-placed, second-best-placed, and close-to-second-bestplaced. Finally, one would use the results generated in this fashion to calculate the merger
fee that would guarantee that the decision that would be most privately profitable for the
MPs would also be most pro-competitive.
A numerical example might be useful. Assume that one had reached the following
two conclusions: (1) absent any efficiencies, the relevant merger would decrease competition by two million dollars and would generate eight hundred thousand dollars profit for
its participants; (2) the ratio of the competitive value of the efficiencies the merger would
generate to the profits they would yield the MPs was two to one. These facts imply that
the merger would be pro-competitive only if it yielded efficiencies that were worth more
than one million dollars to its participants - since only then would the competitive value
of the efficiencies exceed the two million dollar competitive loss the merger would have
generated absent the efficiencies in question. The public fee-setter would therefore set the
merger fee at $1,800,000, .since the MPs would be willing to pay that fee only if they
expected the merger to generate efficiencies that were worth at least one million dollars
to them.
I should also note that a perfectly analogous method could be used if one's goal was
to increase allocative efficiency. Two changes would be necessary. First, one would have
to substitute in step one a calculation of the amount by which the merger would misallocate resources if it did not generate efficiencies for the original estimate of the amount by
which it would reduce competition in such circumstances. Second, one would calculate
in step three the ratio of the allocative value of the relevant efficiencies to their private
value to the MPs rather than the competitive value/private MP value ratio described
above.
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sequences of such changes in position are likely to prevail. Thus,
a merger that improves the MPs' competitive position by generating a static efficiency (e.g., by reducing its marginal cost) will
tend to increase competition by reducing the Rs' BCAs whenever
the relevant MP either was second-best-placed or was worsethan-second-best-placed by less than the efficiency in question.
Moreover,- any tendency such an efficiency has to reduce the Rs'
BCA will also reduce the Rs' ability to obtain OMs naturally
as well as the OCAs and contrived OMs the MPs enjoy or obtain.
Finally, even if the efficiency does not lessen any R's BCA, it
might diminish its contrived OM by allowing the merged firm
to profit from undercutting an oligopolistic price the R might
otherwise have contrived to obtain. Similarly, a merger that reduced the 'II'nbarrier the merged company faced (e.g., by combining an MP with excess managerial capacity in its production
department with an MP with excess capacity in distribution)
would tend to increase the intensity of QV investment competition72 by reducing the 'lt'n barrier73 and perhaps the M disincentives74 facing the established firm that would be best-placed to
expand the market's QV investment if entry were precluded.
Accordingly, the net competitive effect of any horizontal
merger will depend on whether its tendency to generate static and
dynamic efficiencies that will increase the competitive pressure
the MPs place on their rivals outweighs its tendency to reduce
such competition by internalizing to the merged firm the damage
its predecessors' price and QV investment moves previously inflicted on each other as well as by facilitating various contrived
and actual oligopolistic interactions between the MPs and their
Rs.
72. Assuming that potential competition is ineffective.
73. Assuming that one of the MPs was originally the relevant best-placed expander
or that he originally faced barriers that exceeded those confronting the relevant bestplaced expander by less than the efficiencies the merger would generate.
74. Assume, for example, that a rival of the MPs was originally the only firm that
was not deterred from expanding by the (1rn + R + S + L)E barriers it faced and that
this R -was deterred froni expanding by the M disincentives it originally confronted, By
reducing the 1rn. barriers the merged firm faced, the merger might eliminate the M
disincentives confronting the R by guaranteeing that the merged firm would expand if tho
R did not. Admittedly, perverse results are also possible in this context. Thus, when tho
R in question originally would have expanded despite th!:) M disincentives he faced, tho
merger might deter his expansion by creating a situation in which both ho and tho merged
firm faced higher (natural) oligopolistic disincentives. Alternatively, such a dynamic efficiency might tend to reduce competition by inducing the merged company to prevent
entry by expanding in a situation in which entry would otherwise have occurred. However,
I am confident that both these perverse results are less likely than tho pro-competitive
effect described in the text.
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2. A Critique of the Market-Oriented Approach to Merger

Analysis
As we have seen, Bork follows the universal tradition of predicting the competitive consequences of horizontal mergers from
the MPs' market shares and their market's concentration. This
section will explain the preferability of an alternative that would
not require any "relevant market" to be defined.
The undesirability of the traditional approach partially reflects the inability of market-share data to reveal much about a
large number of highly relevant factors to which it does not even
purport to relate. Thus, market shares have little bearing on (1)
the potentially pro-competitive efficiencies the merger will generate, (2) many determinants of the effectiveness of potential competition (e.g., the growth rate of market demand), and (3) many
reputational, informational, and other factors (e.g., the stability
of buyer preferences through time or the strategic and mechanical
costs of changing an operational price) that affect the ability of
the relevant sellers to obtain natural or contrived oligopolistic
margins. Of course, if this were the traditional approach's sole
failing, market share and concentration data could continue to
play a crucial role in the analysis of the legality of horizontal
mergers; one could simply amend the traditional approach by
adjusting the various combinations of market shares and concentration levels that condemn a horizontal merger to reflect the
value of the significant factors to which traditional market-share
data is insensitive.
However, a far more radical departure is required. In particular, the market-oriented approach must be totally rejected, because in our monopolistically competitive world, market share
and concentration data do not even tell us much about the factors
to which they supposedly do relate. More specifically, the
market-oriented approach fails because data on the merger partners' market shares and on the concentration of the relevant
markets do not predict well such matters as (1) how often the
merger partners were each other's closest competitors, (2) the size
of the second-best-placed merger partner's OCA over the thirdbest-placed supplier of the relevant buyers, (3) how ·often the
merger partners were close to being each other's closest competitors, (4) how often the merger partners were or were close to being
their various other rivals' closest competitors, (5) how often and
to what extent either merger partner was a close competitor of one
of its rivals significantly less often than vice versa, (6) to what
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extent (in the above cases) the other merger partner was a close
competitor of that rival more often than vice versa, (7) how many
firms could undercut any given contrived OM that the market's
various sellers might charge, (8) to what extent a retaliating
merger partner was its partner's close competitor less often than
were the firms whose undercutting its retaliation would deter, (9)
to what extent an undermining across-the-board price or new QV
investment would harm some products or outlets disproportionately more than others, and (10) the probability that one or
both MPs would have been best-placed to expand their market's
QV investment beyond what would otherwise be its equilibrium
level. At least in part, the inability of such market-aggregated
data to predict these determinants of the impact of horizontal
mergers reflects the product and locational differentiation that
are the defining characteristics of our monopolistically competitive world - viz., reflects the facts that in such a world, even
when there is a clear break in the chain of competitors (so that
markets can be defined in a nonarbitrary way), (1) some firms
outside the associated market will be able to compete for some
of its buyers, (2) various firms within the market will not be
universally or equally competitive with each other, and (3) different firms in the same market, and a fortiori in different markets,
will have very different distributions of competitive ranks, advantages, and disadvantages. 75
75. It should now be possible to explain why mergers between firms with more than
70% of some market may not d~crease competition while mergers between firms with
relatively low market shares may decrease it- i.e., why Bork's particular market-oriented
predictions are likely to be incorrect. In what follows, I will assume that we are dealing
with cases in which there is some nonarbitrary way to define the relevant markets .:._ that
there is, for example, a break in the chain of competitors that permits one to isolate groups
of suppliers who are far more competitive with each other than with anyone else. Even
on this assumption; a merger between firms that have 70% of the relevant market may
not be anticompetitive. Thus, such a merger may not increase the merger partners' BCAs
(and derivatively their natural OMs and their Rs' OCAs) since the MPs may almost never
be each other's closest competitors. This result could obtain either because the MPs were
almost never second-best-placed (because, for example, both MPs produced highly differ•
entiated products whose buyers had strong preferences for the product of their favored MP
over that of the other so that each MP's closest rival was almost always the producer of a
cheaper, nondifferentiated good) or because the MPs were less competitive with each other
than with other firms in the market. (This condition is not inconsistent with our market
definition. Thus, the MPs might still be more competitive with each other than with
anyone outside the market. Alternatively, the MPs might both be quite competitive with
one or more common independent rivals.)
Nor is there any reason to believe that such a merger will increase the merger part•
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ners' natural oligopolistic margins since, for example, it may not increase their BCAs, may
not yield any relevant economies of scale and may not significantly improve· the MPs'
ability to initiate a series of premature price announcements. Moreover, for two reasons,
such a merger may also not increase the MPs' contrived OMs. First, such a merger may
not increase the profitability of contriving OMs: in particular, such a merger will not
facilitate contrived oligopolistic pricing if the MPs were never close to being each other's
closest competitors; if they already have sufficient customers to identify their undercutters from repeat sales records; if they have different close rivals; if they have no excess
reciprocal power; and if they have similar harm inflicted to cost-incurred ratios for their
respective marginal necessary acts of retaliation against any given rival. Second, contrived
oligopolistic pricing may have been sufficiently unprofitable pre-merger for such MPs to
make any merger-related increase in its profitability inconsequential: thus, even in concentrated markets contrived oligopolistic pricing will be unprofitable if the MPs have
always been confronted with a large number of equally well-placed "closest" rivals - viz.,
members of a competitive fringe that are second-best-placed far more than they are bestplaced; if the incidence of taste changes varies sufficiently through time to preclude the
drawing of any reliable inferences from repeat sales records; if the MPs rarely are each
other's closest rivals; and if the MPs' closest rivals enjoy very small BCAs. For similar
reasons, a horizontal merger between firms with 70% of the market may not increase the
size of the MPs' Rs' contrived OMs.
Finally, such a merger may also not reduce the intensity of QV investment competition. Thus, since as we have already suggested, such a merger may not reduce the cost of
retaliation, it may not increase the prevailing L barriers. Certainly, there is no reason to
believe that such a merger will inevitably increase the (,r/0 + R) barriers the MPs face
by inducing the merged firm to allocate to consolidating the merger managers who could
otherwise have been used to supervise an expansion; and even if it does, such an increase
will have no significance where potential competition is effective or some other established
firm would have been better placed to expand in any case. Similarly, such a merger will
also not reduce QV investment by increasing M where some other potential or established
rival is better placed to increase the market's QV investment to or beyond its original level
and/or where the MPs can introduce new projects that are largely uncompetitive with their
old.
Thus, the fact that a merger involves firms with 70% of the market does not guarantee
its having any significant tendency to reduce competition. Indeed, where such a merger
does have such a tendency, the fact that the MPs have large market shares is not inconsistent with its producing a sufficient amount of static and dynamic efficiencies to give it a
net pro-competitive impact: once it is recognized that most of the efficiencies that mergers
generate arise from the combination of assets that are complementary for nonscale reasons, there is no reason to suppose that mergers between large firms with high market
shares will be significantly less likely to generate such economies. Accordingly, Bork's
conclusion that mergers between firms with 70% of the market will tend to reduce the
intensity of competition is simply not justified.
For analogous reasons, I would also not assume that a merger between relatively
small firms will not have a net anti-competitive impact. Thus, such a merger will increase
the MPs' BCAs where the MPs are often each other's closest competitors - because they
are second-best-placed far more often than they are best-placed and/or because they are
more competitive with each other than with most other firms in the market in question.
Moreover, for a variety of reasons, such a merger may increase the MPs' contrived
OMs: in particular, such a merger can facilitate contrived oligopolistic pricing in a number
of circumstances - e.g., where the MPs would often have been sufficiently well-placed
to undercut each other's OMs, where the information pooling that the merger permits
increases their ability to detect undercutting and identify their undercutter from their
repeat sales records (because their original sales are too low, because the same rivals are
well-placed to undercut each, and because each has different important information about
the appeal of some rivals' products), where one of the MPs has excess· reciprocal power in
his dealings with a close rival of the other MP, or where the two MPs have different harm
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Accordingly, I believe that predictions of the competitive
effect of horizontal mergers should be based on direct estimates
of the factors I have described. The direct method may not even
be much more expensive: the market-oriented approach already
requires one to make crude estimates of much of the data I have
described in order to define the relevant markets, and my approach obviates deciding which set of market definitions is most
appropriate - a task that consumes an extraordinary amount of
resources to produce aggregate figures with less predictive value
than the disaggregated data from which they are derived. Even
if the optimal version of the nonaggregated approach is more
expensive than the traditional market-oriented procedure, its
inflicted to cost-incurred ratios for their marginal necessary acts of retaliation against the
same rival. Moreover, any such increase in the profitability of contrived oligopolistic
pricing may have practical significance since even small firms in unconcentrated markets
may find it profitable to contrive oligopolistic prices (because only a few of their rivals
would be able to undercut such prices, because the percentage of spontaneous defections
is stable through time, because each seller has a large number of small buyers, because
each R has significant BCAs that make it vulnerable to retaliation, etc.). Similarly, n
merger between firms with low market shares might increase the MP's Ra' contrived OMs
(because both tended to be well-placed to steal the customers of the same Ra, because
some R had a lower harm-inflicted-to-cost-incurred ratio for the marginal necessary net
of retaliation against MPl than against MP2).
Moreover, since BCAs may be higher in an i.mconcentrated market in which differentiated products are produced than in a concentrated market in which a homogeneous
product is produced and since a QV investment may have a concentrated impact within
an unconcentrated market, a horizontal merger that enables two small firms to pool their
power against some QV investor may also decrease QV investment competition by increasing some relevant L barrier. In addition, since small firms may be better placed to expand
than their larger rivals, may operate in markets in which potential competition is ineffective, may have to allocate scarce managerial talent to consolidating their merger, and may
be less able to introduce new variants or outlets that are less-than-typically competitive
with their previous projects, mergers between small firms may also reduce QV investment
competition by raising the critical (,r0 + R) barrier or M disincentive. Finally, since the
fact that a merger involves small fll'IIls in an unconcentrated market does not guarantee
its efficiency, as Bork assumes, R. Boruc, supra note 1, at 219, any anti-competitive
tendency such a merger has may result in its being anti-competitive on balance. (Because
Professor Bork assumes that mergers between small firms in unconcentrated markets
cannot reduce competition, he concludes that they must be motivated by n desire to
achieve efficiencies (or to take advantage of tax gimmicks). Since, as we have seen, such
mergers can reduce competition, Bork's conclusion about their probable efficiency is unwarranted.)
In short, I believe that a detailed analysis of the factors that determine the competitive impact of a horizontal merger suggests that the correlation between the market shores
of the MPs and the concentration of their market, on the one hand, and the competitive
impact of their merger, on the other, is too low to justify Bork's rule. Indeed, in our
monopolistically competitive world, I would not even establish n presumption that high
market share mergers in concentrated markets are anti-competitive or that low-mnrketshare mergers in unconcentrated markets are not. Unfortunately, I see no useful way to
avoid the kind of case-by-case analysis my nonaggregated approach entails.
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greater accuracy would more than justify the additional cost.
Although reasonable persons can certainly disagree about which
of the above factors should be estimated and how precisely, I
am confident that some more or less refined version of the nonaggregated approach I have described will be more cost-effective
than any possible market-oriented approach.

E. Monopoly and Monopolization
Three basic issues arise under this heading: (1) how does one
tell whether a firm possesses monopoly power (inter alia, what is
the relationship between a firm's market share and its monopoly
power); (2) what is the legal significance of a firm's possessing
monopoly power under a proper interpretation of section 2's rule
that no person "shall monopolize"; and (3) on policy grounds,
should one break up firms that have monopoly power.
1.

The Relationship Between Market Share and Monopoly
Power

Although Professor Bork is clearly dissatisfied with the traditional equation of monopoly power with high market shares, he
does not address this issue directly.76 In fact, the correlation between monopoly power and market share is almost certainly too
low to permit an inference of the former from the latter. 77 In my
opinion, a firm's monopoly power should be defined in terms of
its competitive advantages and the lower of (a) the barriers to
entry facing its best-placed potential competitor or (b) the barriers to expansion and monopolistic investment disincentives facing the established rival who would be best placed to expand QV
investment in the relevant "market" if entry were precluded. On
this definition, a firm's monopoly power will reflect its ability to
charge supracompetitive prices and to earn supracompetitive returns on its most profitable projects without taking advantage of
any kind of oligopolistic interdependence. If one accepts this definition (which does correspond to the general way courts have
defined monopoly power), 78 one clearly will not be able to predict
76. In fact, Bork does not analyze monopoly power and oligopoly power separately.
77. The last section explained inter alia why the ability of firms in different markets
to engage in various oligopolistic interactions probably is not highly correlated with their
market's concentration or their own market shares. This section explains why the monopoly power of firms in different industries will not correlate highly with their respective
market shares.
78. See, e.g., United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391
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a firm's monopoly power from its market share. Thus, a firm's
market share - which reflects the frequency with which it is best
placed - will have little bearing on its competitive advantages
- which equal the amount by which it is best placed. Indeed,
at one extreme, one can imagine a firm with 100% of its market
and virtually no BCAs at all. This result might occur, for example, if the relevant firm was always only slightly better placed
than a "closest rival" that sold the same product in a different
geographic market or that produced a different product through
a process that could be immediately converted to produce a
competitive good. At the other extreme, one can imagine a
firm with a low market share in an o~timally defined market
that did enjoy substantial BCAs when dealing for the patronage
of particular buyers who had a strong preference for its product
or distributive variant. Of course, these extreme cases do not
demonstrate the weakness of the correlation between market
shares and BCAs, but they do suggest why it may be dangerous
to predict a firm's BCAs from its market share. In fact, there is
even less reason to believe that a firm's market share will have
much bearing on its actual and potential rivals' barriers to expansion and entry. Although firms which maintain high shares of
growing markets probably do face lower QV investment barriers
than their established and potential competitors, 79 this correlation has little bearing on the absolute height of the barriers facing
their rivals. In short, I doubt there is much inter-market correlation between a firm's market share and monopoly power. Even if
this view is too pessimistic, the market-oriented approach to predicting a firm's monopoly power would be liable to the same
criticism as its horizontal merger counterpart: it would clearly be
more accurate and might even be cheaper to estimate BCAs,
entry barriers, expansion barriers, and investment disincentives
directly than to try to predict the firm's monopoly power by collecting data to define a relevant market and then predicting the
firm's monopoly power from market share figures that lose much
of the value of the nonaggregated data on which the market definition was based. Obviously, this result has substantial implica(1956): "Monopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition," My
definition focuses on the extent of a firm's nonoligopolistic control over prices and QV
investment.
79. As we shall see, an established seller who is worse placed than some rival to make
a QV investment the latter finds only marginally profitable may still find it profitable to
make the investment in question if his expansion would do less damage to his pre-existing
capital than the rival investment it deters. See text at note 84 infra.
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tions for the drafting of any new deconcentration legislation as
well as for the interpretation of any current antitrust provision
that is held to make possession of monopoly power an element of
an antitrust offense.
2.

The Relationship Between Monopoly Power and a Section 2
Offense

As Bork shows, 80 the courts - and indeed individual judicial
opinions - have waffled among three interpretations of the Sherman Act's command that "no person shall monopolize." According to the most stringent version of this command, section 2 prohibits the possession of monopoly power; according to the least
stringent version, section 2 prohibits the possession of monopoly
power only if it has been achieved through conduct that would
itself constitute a Sherman Act violation; and finally, according
to Judge Wyzanski's intermediate version, although section 2
does not prohibit monopoly power obtained through legitimate
business skill (i.e., through "allocative efficiency"), it does condemn monopoly in some cases in which no behavioral violations
of the Act have occurred - viz., where the monopoly grew from
neither business skill nor behavioral violations but from some
"practice which without being predatory, abusive, or coercive was
in economic effect exclusionary. " 81
Professor Bork argues for the least stringent interpretation-of
section 2. Although Bork's policy argument for this interpretation
is not entirely convincing since the allocative efficiency of much
of the behavior on which judges have focused is far more ambiguous than Bork maintains, his interpretation is more compatible
with the fact that the Act does condemn "monopolization" and
not "monopoly." Moreover, this linguistic argument is confirmed
by the greater compatibility of the least stringent interpretation
with the structure of American regulatory policy - which recognizes and protects (for example, through patent laws) the right
of individuals to improve the demand-cost combination they face
by reducing their costs or improving their products as w~ll as
their right to exploit any such position. On these grounds, then,
I share Bork's preference for the least restrictive interpretation of
section 2. However, I agree neither with Bork's independent criti80. See R. BORK, supra note 1, at 164-75.
81. See id. at 171 (quoting Judge Wyzanski's opinion in United States v. United Shoe
Mach., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341 (D. Mass. 1953)).
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cism of Wyzanski's intermediate test nor with Bork's analysis of
the legality of many of the practices at issue in major section 2
cases. As we have seen, Wyzanski focused on the intermediate
case of monopolies caused by behavior that was neither predatory
nor allocatively efficient. Bork dismisses Wyzanski's contention
that such monopolies violate section 2 on the ground that it deals
with an empty legal box - i.e., that profitable business behavior
must be either anti-competitive (violate the Sherman Act) or
allocatively efficient. However, this contention is simply incorrect. In general, a firm may find particular behavior profitable for
three different reasons: (1) because it reduces the attractiveness
of the rival offers against which it must compete (because it is
anti-competitive); (2) because it improves the demand-cost position of the firm by reducing its costs or changing the character of
its product (because it is presumptively allocatively efficient); or
(3) because it helps the firm to exploit a given demand-cost position. Unfortunately, as Wyzanski's analysis implies, practices
that function in the third way may well be allocatively inefficient
even though they are privately profitable. Thus, as we shall see
in Part F, various kinds of pricing strategies (such as price discrimination and transaction-surplus-saving supramarginal-cost
price-shifting tie-ins) can misallocate resources while they increase their employers' profits by raising their ability to convert
buyer into seller surplus. Moreover, although· this result is probably atypical, such practices may occasionally produce the anticompetitive relult Wyzanski fears - i.e., may lead some rival to
exit by making it profitable in the short run for their user to offer
better terms to buyers who otherwise would have patronized the
rivals in question. 82 However, even when they do, I reject Wyzanski's assumption that the resulting monopoly violates the Sherman Act on the ground that our legal system's recognition of the
right to innovate (reduce costs and change products) implies the
legitimacy of attempts to exploit the more favorable demand-cost
position thereby achieved. 83 In short, Wyzanski's legal box is misanalyzed, not empty (as Bork supposes).
Moreover, although Wyzanski's functional classification of
business conduct (e.g., of the ten-year leases United Shoe employed) is often highly debatable, Bork too readily assumes the
82. Note that, on my interpretation, such an act would not violate the Sherman Act
since its profitability would not depend on its inducing the relevant rival to exit.
83. Indeed, as I have already suggested, I would even qualify the Clayton Act's
competitive impact test to reflect this judgment.
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allocative efficiency of the various types of behavior that has led
judges to condemn particular monopolies. In fact, the character
of even such apparently desirable behavior as Alcoa's eager embracing of every investment opportunity84 is highly ambiguous.
To see why, let's exa.mine United Shoe's ten-year leases. United's
ten-year lease may simply have been an efficient method of insuring that its product reputation would not be damaged by improper servicing, of supplying its customers (shoe manufacturers)
with capital, and of shifting risk from them to United. On this
account, the fact that United's customers could save relatively
little money by ;retµrning the machines early would reflect the
fact that much of the "-rent" paid in later years was really a
repayment of the loan United supplied by undercharging them in
early years. On the other hand, particularly if United arranged
new leases with its customers well before the expiration of its
old, the loans might have been a form of predatory pricing
directed at potential entrants. On this account, United's loans
would have conveyed a bribe (in the form of a reduced rent) to
its customers conditional on their committing themselves to
United - i.e., conditional on their agreeing to terms that would
have made it far less attractive for them to shift their patronage
to a new entrant. Although the resulting increase in the barriers
to entry might have been disadvantageous to United's customers
as a group, the cost to United of securing this advantage may well
have been minimal. Thus, although each of its customers might
have required a large payment for its commitment if its refusal
would have bound all other buyers to follow its example, each
might be willing to succumb for a small payment if the survival
of any new shoe equipment manufacturer depended on its obtaining a large number of customers and each shoe manufacturer
realized that its individual availability would not significantly
affect a potential entrant's profit expectations. In other words,
since a decision by any given customer to maintain its flexibility
might provide a kind of public good for all ofUnited's customers,
United might be able to purchase its customers' commitment
cheaply. Clearly, such behavior would violate the Sherman Act
(as I construe it) since its profitability would depend on its tendency to reduce the attractiveness of the rival offers against which
United had to compete. Of course, if the cost of determining
whether such a bribe had actually been conveyed was high, a
84. These expansions led Judge Learned Hand to condemn Alcoa's monopoly in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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presumption of efficiency would be justified if the likelihood of
such a predatory bribe were relatively low. I suspect that such
bribes may be executed too often for this possibility to be ignored.
In any case, I doubt that the cost of identifying such bribes would
turn out to be prohibitive. 85
In short, the allocative efficiency and legal status of much of
the behavior on which section 2 judges have focused is far more
ambiguous than Bork maintains. I suspect -that Bork would not
find this result entirely displeasing, since it would justify a reinterpretation of some landmark section 2 cases that would make
them more compatible with the legal rule we both believe the
Sherman Act contains.
85. In fact, the character of even Alcoa's practice of "doubling and redoubling its
capacity before others entered the field" could violate my interpretation of the Sherman
Act. Although, obviously, Hand's opinion does not draw these distinctions, one could
differentiate three categories of monopoly-producing, entry-deterring expansions: the first
would contain all entry-deterring expansions that would have been profitable even if entry
had been independently precluded - e.g., even if the investor faced the associated monopolistic investment disincentives he would have confronted if there were no threat of
entry. The second would include all entry-deterring expansions that would not have been
profitable if the threat of entry had not eliminated the monopolistic investment disincentives the investor would otherwise have faced - i.e., that would not have been profitable
had they not deterred an entry that would have reduced the profits the investor realized
on his pre-existing capital. Finally, the third would include any entry-deterring expansion
whose profitability depended on its reducing the profits the investor realized on his preexisting projects less than they would have been reduced by the entry the expansion in
question deterred - i.e., whose profitability depended on the monopolistic investment
incentive the potential entrant created. It is clear to me that all expansions in this third
category would violate my interpretation of the Sherman Act since their profitability
depends on their reducing the attractiveness of the offers against which the investor's preexisting projects compete. In fact, a rule condemning such "reprehensible, anticompetitive" expansions would even make good policy sense: the fact that the expansion's
profitability depended on the expanding established firm's monopolistic incentives to
expand implies that the deterred best-placed entrant ~as allocatively better placed than
the expanding established firm to introduce a new QV investment into the market (since
the entry would have been profitable even though the potential entrant had no monopolistic incentive to enter.)
Indeed, I can even imagine an argument that QV investments in the second category
also violate my formulation of the Sherman Act since their profitability does depend on
their reducing the attractiveness of the independent offers against which the expander
must compete. In my opinion, however, this conclusion is not required by my verbal
formulation and would condemn behavior that is in no sense reprehensible. Thus, a rule
forbidding QV investments in category two would not make good policy sense since there
is good reason to believe that the established firms which would make the QV investments
in question would face barriers to expansion that were lower than the barriers to entry
facing the deterred potential entrant - since the alternative conclusion would result in
the relevant inve~tments being made by an allocatively worse-placed firm.
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The Policy Grounds for Deconcentration

As I have suggested, Bork believes not only that the antitrust
laws do not condemn monopoly per se but also that a policy of
deconcentrating industry would seriqusly misallocate resources.
Bork's argument against the deconcentration proposals contains
two major premises. First, he maintains that there is no
"significant output restriction problem arising from the concentration of any industry." 86 And second, he contends that since
"any size [a company] achieve[s] by internal growth without
predation is the most efficient size for that firm," then "the dissolution of any such firm will always create an efficiency loss. " 87 I
have already explained why I disagree with Bork's first p:remise.
I also disagree with his second, which takes a mistakenly static
view of industrial efficiency. More particularly, I disagree with
Bork's second premise because the efficiency of established firm
expansions reflects their need to grow88 rather than to take advantage of static economies of scale. If I am correct, it may be possible to require efficient expanders to divest some of their projects
without reducing their operating efficiency. Admittedly, such a
divestiture policy might artificially reduce the incentive of firms
to invest in their original "market"89 and might even induce them
to raise their prices90 or underinvest in cost-reducing innovation
or product improvements. 91 Nevertheless, a deconcentration policy directed at industries with higher-than-average DU/QV ratios
(rather than at industries with high concentration levels) might
still be allocatively justified by its ability to reduce inter-industry
86. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 178.
87. Id. at 194.
88. As Edith Penrose has argued, firms need to grow in order to make full use of the
increasing managerial talent at their disposal - increasing because, unlike most assets,
the productive capacity of managers tends to increase through time - i.e., with experience. See E. PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM (1959).
89. Even if a divestiture order would not affect the operating efficiency of a company,
the transaction cost of selling a division would reduce the private returns of an expansion.
A deconcentration policy would therefore create an artificial incentive for firms to diversify. I should note, however, that this artificial incentive might be a useful offset to the
monopolistic investment incentives that artificially increase the absolute and relative
attractiveness of expanding in one's original markets (as opposed to diversifying).
90. If the likelihood that a firm would be required to divest one or more of its projects
increased with its market share, a firm might find it profitable to charge a price that
exceeded the conventional profit-maximizing level in order to reduce its sales and market
share.
91. If the likelihood that a firm would be required to divest one or more of its projects
increased with its BCAs and the barriers to entry and expansion its rivals faced, the
divestiture policy would artificially reduce the relevant firm's incentive to increase its
BCAs and the barriers in question.
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and quantity-vs.-QV-investment misallocations. 92 I should emphasize, however, (1) that the current deconcentration proposals
- which focus on market shares and concentration - would be
totally ill-suited for this purpose, (2) that QV investment misallocation might better be handled through tax policy in any case, 93
and (3) that reasonable persons certainly could conclude that the
resource misallocation caused by legitimately obtained monopoly
power cannot be reduced without generating prohibitive transaction costs and misallocative incentive distortions.

F. The Competitive Effect and Allocative Efficiency of Vertical
Practices

As I have suggested, Professor Bork analyzes accurately and
comprehensibly many of the legitimate business functions of the
various vertical practices to which the antitrust laws relate. This
section will investigate his conclusion that such practices virtually never reduce competition and always increase allocative
efficiency.
Two preliminary questions must be addressed before we can
analyze the competitive effect of such vertical practices as resale
price maintenance, vertical territorial restraints, price discrimination, tie-ins, and reciprocity: (1) are we to focus on the competitive effect of an individual firm's use of these techniques or the
competitive effect of a rule allowing all suppliers of some buyer
or buyers to use them and (2) when analyzing a technique's competitive effect, should we ask what behavior the parties will substitute for the behavior we contemplate forbidding. At times, the
courts have concluded (1) that they should look to the competitive effect of an individual firm's use of a technique and (2) that
behavior that is anti-competitive compared with some alternative
is not legal simply because the lawful behavior with which it will
be replaced is even more anti-competitive. I disagree with both
these positions. The first converts the courts into parimutuel
handicappers by requiring them to forbicj more successful firms
92. As we saw, such a policy would also be likely to reduce labor-leisure misallocation,
present-vs.-future consumption misallocation, RUO misallocation among distant competitors (since the relevant firms would probably have higher-than-average P/MC ratios),
as well as various income-distribution misallocations.
93. Thus, one could raise (lower) the effective tax rate on corporate profits in industries that would otherwise have a higher (lower)-than-average DU/QV ratio. Admittedly,
such a policy would not generate the first three types of improvements listed in the
previous footnote. However, these disadvantages might be outweighed by the difference
between the transaction cost of administering such a statute and the sum of the transaction costs and operating efficiency losses any divestiture order would generate.
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from using profitable techniques that less successful firms may
use. In brief, I find this objectionable both because it is inconsistent with the notion that firms that have lawfully obtained
BCAs may enjoy their fruits and because it would require the
courts to force firms to operate in an allocatively (as well as a
privately) inefficient manner. The second is objectionable because it compels the courts to make decisions which clearly will
have anti-competitive effects - in the face of the clear congressional goal of increasing the intensity of competition.
Bork's discussion of the competitive effect of vertical practices focuses on the leverage theory that the only function of such
practices is to enable firms to use their ."monopoly power" in one
market to obtain monopoly power in another. As Bork and many
others have argued, this theory basically assumes that the monopolist can have his cake and eat it too - that the monopolist
can use in a second market the monopoly power he enjoys in a
first market without forfeiting his ability to use that power in the
first as well. In reality, except in the trivial case in which the
vertical practice functions by concealing predatory behavior, no
vertical practice can have an anti-competitive effect unless its
profitability does not depend on its reducing competition. Although this conclusion implies that such practices cannot violate
the Sherman Act, it leaves open the possibility that an individual
vertical agreement or {preferably) the general availability of such
agreements may violate the Clayton Act. In particular, such
agreements may violate the Clayton Act as I construe it if they
are less profitable for marginal established competitors or potential entrants than for well-established concerns and if their relative profitability does not reflect their relative allocative efficiency when used by the firms in question. Although Bork is
somewhat too complacent about this issue, his conclusion that
such agreements do not violate the Clayton Act is undoubtedly
generally correct - primarily because such agreements do not
seem likely to favor well-established firms, but also because their
profitability often reflects their allocative efficiency.
However, I disagree with Bork's conclusion that virtually all
such vertical practices are allocatively efficient. In part, my disagreement derives from my rejection of the two premises that underlie his method for predicting an event's allocative efficiency.
In part, though, it reflects his failure to recognize (in this context
as well) one of the major ways in which business practices can
increase profits; i.e., that a business practice can increase profits
not only by (1) creating business efficiencies and (2) by reducing
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the competition the firm confronts but also, as Judge Wyzanski
may have perceived, (3) by increasing its ability to exploit a given
demand-marginal cost position (e.g., to convert buyer into seller
surplus). Although I disagree with Wyzanski's assumption that
such practices tend to reduce competition ("further the dominance" of the firm), there is no reason to expect them to be
allocatively efficient.
Admittedly, many of the vertical practices Bork analyzes do
generate business efficiencies. For example, resale price agreements or vertical territorial restraints generate efficiencies when
they increase the ability of firms to induce their distributors to
offer pre-sales advice or post-sales service or to communicate
their discoveries to each other. So do tying (reciprocity) agreements that reduce the cost a seller (buyer) has to incur to deter
its customers (supplier) from combining its product with privately and allocatively inferior complements (using inferior ingredients). However, many vertical practices function exclusively in
the third way just described. Thus, price discrimination and certain types of tie-ins function by increasing their employer's ability to take advantage of a given demand-marginal cost position.
Since such practices probably do not promote allocative efficiency in any way in our worse-than-second-best world (given the
undesirability of the additional QV investment they may generate by enabling their employer to profit more from any BCAs they
create) and since they misallocate resources directly in a variety
of different ways, they are likely to be allocatively inefficient in
relation to both the simple kind of single pricing that dominates
economics textbooks and the more sophisticated kinds of pricing
systems likely to be adopted if these devices are prohibited.
In what follows, I will illustrate these points (as well as the
inadequacy of Bork's unit-output allocative-efficiency test) by
analyzing the allocative efficiency of price discrimination and one
type of tie-in, which I call a transaction-surplus-saving94 supramarginal-cost price-shifting tie-in. Bork bases his conclusion that
price discrimination is not generally misallocative on the fact
that an individual seller's price discrimination seems as likely to
increase as to decrease its own unit output (in comparison with
single pricing - i.e., in comparison with a policy of setting a
single per-unit price and allowing buyers to purchase as much as
94. Transaction surplus is defined to equal the sum of buyer and seller surplus - i.e.,
the area between the demand curve the seller faces and his marginal cost curve, between
zero output and the actual output.
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they want at that price). In fact, if the unit-output price test for
allocative efficiency were justified, price discrimination might
even be allocatively justified by its tendency to increase the discriminator's rivals' unit outputs since the ability of a firm to offer
a low discriminatory price to someone else's customers will induce
its better-placed rival to charge a lower price (and therefore sell
a higher unit output).
·
As we have seen, however, one cannot predict a practice's
allocative efficiency from its effect on unit output. Unfortunately,
the more sophisticated analysis I outlined in the second section
suggests that price discrimination is almost certainly less allocatively desirable than single pricing- at least when the discriminatory prices are charged to buyers the relevant seller is bestplaced to serve. Clearly, since price discrimination is more expensive to execute than single pricing (the discriminator must do
additional market research to determine which of its customers
place higher and lower values on its product, must incur the extra
cost of communicating prices individually to its customers, and
must incur costs to prevent its low-price customers from engaging
in arbitrage), the practice will be misallocative if it has a neutral
effect on other sorts of resource allocation. In fact, at least when
practiced in relation to customers the discriminator is bestplaced to serve, price discrimination seems likely to increase
other kinds of resource misallocation. Thus, such price discrimination will tend to generate consumption-optimum misallocation
by allocating goods from buyers who valued them more highly
(buyers who would have purchased the relevant product at its
optimal single price but do not at the higher discriminatory price)
to buyers who value them less highly (buyers who buy them only
because of a discriminatory low price). 95 By enabling marginal QV
investors to reduce the surplus their consumers realize, such
price discrimination may also exacerbate quantity-vs.-QV investment misallocation. 96 Admittedly, the non-transaction cost
95. This conclusion relates to the traditional welfare economics proof that consumption-optimum misallocation will arise where the relative cost of two goods to buyers of
both is not the same at the margin. Obviously, price discrimination does not result in a
physical transfer of some product X from a higher-demand to a lower-demand buyer.
Instead, the middle-demand original buyer of X who is offered the higher price purchases
some product V instead while the low-demand buyer who is offered the lower price buys
X rather than the W he originally purchased. However, since there is no reason to believe
that P/MC will differ in Wand V, the resource flows from X-middle (XM) to V and from
W to X-low (XL) can be treated as a flow from XMto XL (inasmuch as the missing V to
W link would be allocatively neutral if [P/MClv equalled [P/MC]w.
96. Recall that the distortion introduced by consumer surplus offsets the larger
distortions introduced by supracompetitive pricing. Relatedly, price discrimination will
also cause resource misallocation to the extent that it encourages firms to use resources
to obtain monopoly positions thro 11gh anticompetitive behavior.
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effects of price discrimination may be desirable when the discriminator offers its low price to someone else's customer. Thus,
although sales made by competitive inferiors will normally be
misallocative in themselves (will normally cause intra-industry
RUO misallocations), a rule that allowed firms to discriminate
would probably cause not an increase in such sales but a decrease in the prices charged by the competitive superiors of the
potential discriminators. In my terminology, such a rule would
reduce the OCAs of the discriminator's rivals 97 by reducing the
contextual cost of discrimination. As we have seen, any such
tendency to reduce prices would improve resource allocation by
decreasing quantity-vs.-QV investment misallocation, laborleisure misallocation, production-process research misallocation,
and various kinds of income-distribution-related misallocation.
Thus, even though resources will normally be misallocated by
price discrimination directed at the seller's own customers, there
may be an allocative case for allowing sellers to charge discriminatorily low prices to someone else's customers. 98 In any case,
Bork is clearly far too optimistic about the allocative efficiency
of price discrimination.
Bork is also too optimistic about the allocative efficiency of
the vertical devices (such as tying and reciprocal-trading agreements) firms use to increase their ability to exploit their demandmarginal cost position in their relations with a single customer. I
will illustrate this point by analyzing the allocative efficiency of
a type of full requirements tie-in he does not discuss - viz., the
supramarginal-cost price-shifting tie-in in which a seller X sells
some product A for a lower unit price than he otherwise would
have charged on condition that the buyer Y purchase for more
than its market price its full requirements of a second product B
(that may be neither a substitute nor a complement of A).
To analyze such tie-ins, we must first examine the pricing
strategy a nonperfect competitor would find optimal for an individual buyer if that seller could not use tying or reciprocatory
97. To the extent that differences in the contextual legal costs of discrimination that
different rivals would face created differences in the amount by which competitive inferiors were disadvantaged, the legalization of price discrimination would decrease contrived OMs as well by increasing the number of inferiors able to profit in the short run
from undercutting a given OM.
98. Such a solution would best be implemented by giving price discriminators a
"someone else's customer" defense (which resembles vaguely the "meeting competition
in good faith" defense of our present Robinson-Patman Act). Obviously, the viability of
this approach depends on the ability of the sellers to prove to a reviewing authority that
they were not best placed to serve buyers to whom they granted price concessions.
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agreements. Diagram 2 illustrates the possible strategies such a
seller could choose (as well as the functioning of the type of tiein with which we are now concerned). In particular, Diagram 2
shows the position of a seller X who faces curves DDXAY and
MCXAY when selling product A to buyer Y. If such a seller were
required to sell A separately, if could use any of three strategies:
(1) perfect price discrimination {pure lump-sum pricing), which
it could effectuate by charging the buyer the highest lump-sum·
fee it would be willing to pay (NIG in a perfectly informed world)
for the right to purchase A for a per unit price OG equal to its
transaction-surplus-maximizing (TSM) marginal cost (its marginal cost at its TSM output - GI, the output at which DDXAY
and MCx'At intersect); 99 (2) conventional single pricing, which
would be effectuated by charging no lump-sum fee and the supramarginal cost price ( qa) associated with the output at which the
conventional MR and MC curves intersect ( aB); and (3) a mixed
strategy in which a smaller lump-sum fee (say NKJ in a perfectly
informed world) is combined with a supracompetitive per unit
price (say OJ). Obviously, if inform""ation were perfect and transaction costs zero, the perfect price-discrimination strategy would
be optimal, since the lump-sum fee can convert all buyer surplus
into seller surplus without reducing output and thereby destroying transaction surplus. In practice, however, pure lump-sum
pricing is unlikely to be optimal. In a world of imperfect information and transaction costs, perfect price discrimination reduces
its user's profits (in comparision with single pricing) (1) by offering no protection against his o~ pessimism (when he may underestimate the lump-sum Y would pay because he underestimates
the units¥ expects to buy), 100 (2) by.offering no protection against
Y's pessimism (where Y underestimates his quantity demand.for
A and therefore the dollar value of the right to purchase A), 101 (3)
by increasing the total risk costs he and Y must bear by shifting
the risk that Y's quantity demand will tum out to be lower than
99. DDXAvand MCXAyrespectively stand for the demand and marginal cost curves
X faces when seiling A to Y.
100. If X underestimates Y's quantity demand for A, X's supramarginal cost price
will give him unanticipated profits when Y turns out to purchase more A than X antici-

pated.
101. If Y underestimates his own quantity demand for A, he will also underestimate
the additional costs X's supramarginal cost price will impose on him (and hence will be
willing to give X more profits in the form of such unit markups than in the form of a lumpsum fee).
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expected from X to ¥1°2 (where Y is more risk-averse or X's uncertainty is smaller than Y's because, for example, retailer Y is interested in his share of the resale market for A while X is interested
only in A's overall sales), (4) by increasing the costs X must incur
to prevent or allow arbitrage (by creating a difference between the
per unit price Y pays and the average lump-sum plus unit price
X seeks from other buyers), and (5) by increasing the costs X has
to incur to negotiate and execute his contract with Y (by complicating the agreement and necessitating a written document). On
the other hand, except where transactions involve little money,
single pricing will also be nonoptimal, since it allows much unnece~sary consumer surplus to escape, (N/fo:), and destroys (/31~)
transaction surplus as well by reducing A's unit price sales below
the transaction-surplus-maximizing level at which DDxAY and
MCXAY intersect. In general, then, sellers will find it optimal to
combine a lump-sum fee with some supramarginal cost pricing.
In particular, the optimizing seller will continue to raise his per
102. Under a lump-sum pricing arrangement, Y has additional risk because his payment will not decline proportionately with his quantity demand when his quantity demand turns out to be less than he expected. X is interested in the risk costs Y must bear
because they influence the size of the lump-sum fee that Yis willing to pay- i.e., because
they reduce the payment he is willing to make below NIG.
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unit price and lower his lump-sum fee until the benefits unitprice increases create (by helping him to overcome his and his
customer's pessimism, by reducing the sum of his and his customer's risk costs, and by decreasing his customer's incentive to
engage in arbitrage) just equal the costs such increases create by
reducing output and destroying transaction surplus. Obviously,
then, one factor that will influence the amount of supramarginal
cost pricing such a seller will find optimal is the relative amount
of transaction surplus successive unit price increases must destroy to convert buyers surplus into seller surplus - i.e., the
seller-surplus-plus buyer-surplus-minus ratio (ASS +/ABS-) for
marginal increases in prices, 103 where the difference between
(ASS+) and (ABS-) is the amount of transaction surplus the relevant price increase destroys (ATS-). Ceteris paribus,ASS+/ABSwill tend to be higher the smaller the original gap between price
and marginal cost, the greater the original output, the steeper the
relevant demand curve, and the less positively sloped the relevant
marginal cost curve. In what follows, I will assume that X's optimal independent strategy would be to charge Ya lump-sum fee
of LMKJ for the right to purchase as much A as he wishes at
per-unit price OJ (where NML equals the risk costs such an arrangement would impose on Y plus any buyer surplus its strategic
bargaining position enables it to obtain).
We should now be able to understand how a tie-in can benefit
a seller by increasing the efficiency of his supramarginal cost
pricing by shifting its locus to a different product with a more
suitable DD-MC combination. As I have suggested, Diagram 2
illustrates this possibility as well. In addition to DDXAY, MRXAY,
and MCXAY, Diagram 2 contains four other curves with which we
will be concerned. All four assume that X manufactures A, that
Y is a retailer that resells both A and B to final consumers Z, and
that (for convenience sake) Y's marginal costs are costs of goods
sold. Thus, (1) DDvAZ is the demand curve Y faces when reselling
A to Z (since Y is assumed to incur no marginal costs other than
the costs of goods sold, MRYAZ indicates the value of successive
units of A to Z [MRvAZ = DDYBz]); (2) DDYBz and MRYBz are
the demand and marginal revenue curves Y faces when reselling
B to Z (although this assumption is not essentiaito our analysis,
Diagram 2 does assume that Y faces a kinky oligopolistic demand
103. (ASS+) represents the additional surplus a seller can obtain through a marginal increase in his unit price. (ABS-) represents the amount of buyer surplus such a
marginal price increase will remove from the relevant buyer.
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when selling B [though not when selling A], that DDyaz is
kinked at 0 and that MRYBz is therefore discontinuous at the
associated output up ; 104 (3) DD~R,, is the demand curve X
faces when selling B to Y under a full requirements contract
(hence the superscript RC) (since such a contract obligates Y to
treat X as a monopolist of B, the height of DD~y equals the
value of successive units of B to Y - which on our [marginal
cost equals cost-of-goods sold] assumption equals MRyaz);
finally(4) DD:xayindicates the demand curve X would face when
selling B to Y without a full requirement contract (for simplicity,
Diagram 2 assumes that B is produced in a perfectly competitive
market so that DD:xay equals the minimum average total cost of
B [min ATCa], which also equals its marginal cost to X
[MC:xay]}.
X would implement the tie-in with which we are now concerned by offering to reduce the unit price it charges Y for A from
OJ to OG in exchange for Y's agreement to purchase his full
requirements of B from X as well for SD = HC more than its
normal market price. If (as I assume by construction) the extra
surplus Y expects to obtain on A (JKIG) equals the expected cost
to him of the full requirements contract on B (CDSH) and if (as
I also assume) the tie-in does not increase the riskiness of this
transaction for Y, Y will be indifferent between this tie-in and the
independent deal on A X would otherwise have offered. However, X will not in general be indifferent between these two
options. Thus, on the plus side, the tie-in will tend to be more
attractive for X, to the extent that the ASS+/ ABS- ratio for the
price increase on Bis higher than ASS-/ABS+ for the relevant
price decrease on A. Since in Diagram 2, X can remove CDSH =
JKLG of buyer surplus by raising its price on B without destroying the KIF in transaction surplus it would have had to
destroy to remove a comparable amount of surplus by raising its
104. Kinked oligopolistic demand curves arise in tightly oligopolistic markets in
which each seller finds that his rivals will not follow his price increases above the prevailing market level though they will match his price decreases below the prevailing level.
Such a reaction pattern will cause the demand curve to kink since it implies that each
seller will lose more sales if he raises his price above the prevailing market level than he
will gain if he lowers his price the same amount below the original prevailing market level.
Obviously, since each seller will therefore gain more marginal revenue by reducing his
price to the prevailing market level than he will obtain by lowering his price below the
prevailing market level, the marginal revenue curve associated with a kinked oligopoly
demand curve will be discontinuous at the output associated with the kink (e.g., at output
&pin Diagram 2). The structure portrayed in Diagram 2 could be found in many situations. For example, if X - a clothing store in a small town - were the only store to sell
high quality suits (product A) but sold socks and underwear (product B) in competition
with a department store or Army-Navy store, it might face a kinked oligopoly demand
curve on B but not A.
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price on A, the tie-in will yield KIF more profits than X's optimal
mixed strategy in the situation in question, other things being
equal. Although this result is associated with the discontinuity in
DD:S~ in Diagram 2, comparable results can be generated by far
less restrictive assumptions. Similar·results will occur to the extent that B's TSM output is higher than A's, -DD-~y is steeper
than DD~~ over the relevant range, and MCriy is less positively
sloped than MCXAy'to the left of their respective TSM outputs.
Of course, any such gains the tie-in achieves will b·e more or less
offset to the extent that the tie-in's ·supramarginal cost pricing on
B offers X less protection against arbitrage, pessimism, and risk
aversion than the supramarginal cost pricing on A it replaces. It
is obvious that the tie-in clearly will be inferior in some such
respects. Not only will the tie-in not reduce Y's incentive to engage in arbitrage on A, it will create an additional enforcement
problem for X by giving Y an incentive to cheat on his requirements obligation on B. However, to the extent that Y's quantity
demands for A and B (at given prices) are always in the same
proportions, X's supramarginal cost pricing on B may give him
virtually the same protection against his pessimism, Y's pessimism, and his and Y's risk aversion as the supramarginal cost
pricing on A it replaces. Thus, since a reseller's (Y's) sales of
accessories (socks and underwear - B) will often be appropriate
to his sales of the relevant main item (suits - A) and since many
resellers ( Y) sell products whose sales depend on the same factor
(e.g., weather), X can often arrange a tie-in such that (1) X will
realize unanticipated profits through his supramarginal cost pricing on B (unanticipated because of X's underestimate of Y's
quantity demand for B) whenever he underestimates Y's quantity
demand for A and hence the lump-sum fee_ Y wquld be willing to
pay him; (2) Y will underestimate the cost to him of accepting
the requirements contracts on B (Y will underestimate his quantity demand for B) whenever he underestimates his quantity demand for A and hence the value of the right to purchase A at its
TSM-marginal cost (the lump sum fee he should be willing to pay
X); and (3) the payments Y must give X for A (in the form of
supramarginal cost prices on B) will decline more or less proportionately with the value to Y of the right to purchase A at its
TSM-marginal cost (since the former depends on Y's quantitydemand for B and the latter on Y's quantity-demand for A, which
we are assuming will fluctuate together). Hence, the type of tiein with which we are now concerned will sometimes increase its
user's profits by reducing the transaction surplus its user's supra-
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marginal cost pricing destroys by more than it raises the user's
enforcement costs, the losses the user sustains from its and its
customers' pessimism, and the risk cost the user and its customers bear.
Now that I have described the way in which such tie-ins
enable sellers to better exploit their demand-marginal cost positions, I should be able to evaluate their allocative efficiency. Unhappily, at least where A and B are not complements or substitutes, 105 such tie-ins are likely to be allocatively inefficient: the
savings in transacti,on surplus they generate generally will not be
associated with an RUO allocative gain in our worse-than-secondbest world, 106 and the investment incentives they create may
actually exacerbate quantity-vs.-QV investment misallocation,
while the associated increase in negotiation, enforcement, and
perhaps risk costs will have allocative as well as private significance. In other words, in our worse-than-second-best world, such
tie-ins are little more than allocatively expensive devices for
transferring income to their users.
In short, since many vertical practices work not by creating
"business efficiencies" but rather by letting their users exploit a
given demand-marginal cost situation, Bork's presumption that
such devices are allocatively efficient is unjustifiable. In fact,
most vertical practices that are designed to enable their employer
to take better advantage of a given demand-marginal cost position are probably misallocative.

G. The Competitive Effect of Conglomerate Mergers and the
Toe-Hold Merger Doctrine
This section will analyze Bork's comments on the competitive effect of conglomerate mergers and the toe-hold merger doctrine - i.e., on the consequences of such mergers and doctrines
for the welfare of the customers of both the MPs and the MPs'
product market rivals R. 107 I will criticize and propose alternatives
105. Where A and B are complements or substitutes (e.g., where they are inputs used
in variable proportions), the saving in transaction surplus is likely to entail an allocative
as well as a private gain.
106. Bork's results reflect the fact that marginal cost will tend to be systematically
below marginal allocative costs in our worse-than-second-best world.
107. I should emphasize the difference between the competitive impact and allocative efficiency of conglomerate mergers or conglomerate merger doctrines. In port, this
difference reflects the fact (already noted) that any tendency a conglomerate merger hos
to decrease (increase) QV investment competition (e.g., by eliminating an effective potential competitor) will probably increase (decrease) its allocative efficiency, given the exces-
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to Bork's two basic conclusions in this area: (1) that conglomerate
mergers can reduce competition in comparison with the status
quo or the independent entry of the outside firm only if the acquired company is a "significant" firm in a market with only one
or two such enterprises108 and (2) that the toe-hold merger doctrine109 is anti-competitive because acquiring firms will find it
most profitable to execute the conglomerate merger 110 that also
provides most benefits for the relevant consumers. 111
1.

Conglomerate Merger and the Status Quo

I reject Bork's first conclusion both (1) because conglomerate
mergers that eliminate an effective potential competitor will reduce competition more often than Bork supposes and (2) because,
contrary to Bork's belief, such mergers can also reduce competition by facilitating contrived oligopolistic (and predatory) pricing.112 Bork's claim that the elimination of an effective potential
siveness of QV investment in our economy. In part, however, this difference reflects the
divergence between the competitive value and allocative value of a given efficiency. For
example, the competitive value of any marginal static efficiency a conglomerate merger
generates for the MPs will be equal to the amount by which it induces the MPs' Rs to
lower their prices by decreasing such firms' OCAs - i.e., by reducing the MPs' basic
competitive disadvantages. Thus, a static marginal efficiency would have substantial
allocative but no competitive value if the two MPs were always either best placed or farworse-than-second-best placed. In fact, even where such an efficiency has some competitive value - e.g., even where it reduces the MPs' costs in relation to customers they were
originally second-best placed to serve, its allocative value (which will depend primarily
on the allocative gains associated with the tendency of any related price reductions to
lower QV investment in the relevant market) will bear little relation to its competitive
value (which will be equal to the extent of the price reductions themselves).
108. See R. BoR1<, supra note 1, at 260.
109. Put crudely, the toe-hold merger doctrine prohibits outside firms from executing
with relatively large inside firms conglomerate mergers that would increase competition
in comparison with the status quo or any entry the outside firms might otherwise have
undertaken. In other words, the toe-hold merger doctrine restricts outside firms to
making so-called toe-hold mergers with relatively small inside firms.
110. Although Bork never admits to this possibility, the doctrine actually presupposes a monotonic relationship between the firm and consumer benefits that would be
generated by the preferred merger and all the alternative behaviors the initiating firm
might engage in (including not only the alternative conglomerate mergers it could execute
in the market in question, but also the alternative conglomerate mergers it could execute
into other markets, the internal expansions it could undertake into the instant or other
markets in which the acquiring firm was or was not already participating, the alternative
horizontal mergers it could execute, or the various decisions it could make to release
managers or capital and thereby make them available to alternative users). Like Bork, I
will ignore these other possibilities in the text that follows. Obviously, their existence
provides one more reason to reject his argument against the toe-hold merger doctrine.
111. R. BORK, supra note 1, at 261-62.
112. Of course, one could argue that this effect should not count against the legality
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competitor will not reduce competition unless there are fewer
than three significant firms in the relevant market 113 reflects the
same misperception that distorted his conclusions about the competitive impact of horizontal mergers: his apparent belief (1) that
QV investment cannot vary in any given market (so that a conglomerate merger that eliminates an actual or threatened entry
cannot thereby affect the intensity of QV investment competition);114 (2) that nonmonopolists enjoy no BCAs (so that a conglomerate merger that deters an entry or established firm QV
investment cannot reduce BCAs); and (3) that oligopolistic margins cannot be contrived unless there are fewer than three significant firms in the market (so that in other circumstances a conglomerate merger cannot increase contrived oligopolistic margins). Since all of these beliefs conflict with the realities of our
monopqlistically competitive world, conglomerate mergers that
eliminate effective potential competitors 115 will always reduce
of the conglomerate merger - that such illegal pricing should be prosecuted when and if
it does occur. In fact, I find this argument quite persuasive where predatory pricing is
concerned. However, oligopolistic pricing is sufficiently more common and sufficiently less
detectable to make me want to count against a merger any tendency it has to facilitate
this practice. I should note that I agree with Bork's rejection of many of the other arguments which have been used to attack conglomerate mergers - e.g., the arguments that
they would reduce competition by lowering costs, creating (71'n+ R) barriers to entry, or
creating opportunities for reciprocal dealing.
113. In fact, Bork assumes that competition will not be injured even if there are fewer
than three significant firms in the acquired firm's market unless the acquired firm itself
is one of the significant firms in question. Bork offers no argument for this qualification
and I am unable to understand its basis. See R. Boru<, supra note 1, at 260.
114. Bork does not discuss the ways or circumstances in which the elimination of a
potential competitor can affect competition. In particular, although he seems to accept
the limit price or wings theory that the presence of an effective potential competitor can
induce a market's established firms tp lower their prices and increase their unit outputs
(see R. BORK, supra note 1, at the first line of page 260), he never explicitly addresses this
issue. In fact, I doubt that potential competition ever induces established firms to lower
their prices in the hope of deterring entry, for I suspect that such limit pricing (1) would
rarely succeed in deterring entry, (2) would rarely be more profitable than allowing entry
to occur even if it were effective, and (3) would rarely be as profitable as the various other
methods established firms could adopt to deter entry - e.g., by making additional QV
(limit) investments themselves. Accordingly, I believe that a conglomerate merger that
eliminates an effective potential competitor will reduce competition either by precluding
the entry he would have executed or by obviating and deterring the limit investments his
presence would have induced. See Limit Price Theory, supra note 13, at 668-82.
115. Bork also does not discuss the circumstances in which an outsider is likely to be
an effective potential competitor. The courts have sometimes talked as if an outsider will
be effective only if he would have entered absent the merger in question. However, the
fact that a potential entrant would not have entered - indeed would not have even
contemplated entry - is coµsistent with his being effective since it may reflect his having
induced his established rivals to invest sufficiently to make entry patently unprofitable
for him. In practice, a uniquely best-placed potential entrant will be effective whenever
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competition in the above three ways - whether or not they involve markets with less than three significant firms - though
these anti-competitive effects may be more or less offset by the
pro-competitive tendencies of the various kinds of efficiencies
such mergers can generate.
I also believe that conglomerate mergers can reduce competition even where they do not eliminate an effective potential competitor by facilitating contrived oligopolistic116 and predatory
pricing.· A conglomerate merger between an outside firm K and
an inside firm E will always facilitate E's contrived oligopolistic
pricing by enabling E to exploit K's reputation for fulfilling his
threats and promises and by increasing the credibility of E's
threats by increasing the benefits retaliation will generate (by
enabling KE's K divisions to exploit the retaliation's enhancing
effect on the new company's tough reputation). Moreover, where
the conglomerate merger partners K and E have a common conglomerate rival KR.Ert:, who is active in both the E market and
some of K's original markets, the K-E merger may facilitate K's
and E's contrived oligopolistic pricing by enabling them simultaneously to communicate to KRER their joint intention to retaliate or reciprocate, by enabling them to pool customers to detect
undercutting and identify their undercutter, by enabling them to
pool other information about the competitive positions of various
rivals that also will facilitate undercutter identification, by enabling them to decrease the cost of effective retaliation by inthe ('11' + R + S + L)N barriers he faces are less than the (:'11'0 + R + S + L)E + M*
0
barriers and disincentives that would confront the established firm that would be bestplaced to expand QV investment to the entry-precluding level. This result implies that
such a potential competitor will be most likely to be effective (1) where the established
firms do not possess patents or raw material monopolies that make ('11'o)N exceed ('11'0 )E,
(2) where market demand is rising sufficiently rapidly to raise the rate at which the
established firms have to expand to preclude entry to a level at which (1r 0 )i;: for the last
necessary expansion exceeds (1r 0 )N for the best-placed potential competitor's entry, and
(3) where the market contains only a few large potential expanders and new projects are
inevitably equally competitive with all their predecessors - so that M* is positive and
significant. By extension, our analysis also implies that a potential competitor who is
either worse-than-best placed or nonuniquely best placed to enter will also be effective
whenever the entry of his superior and equals would not make entry unprofitable for him
if his established rivals made no limit investments. For a further discussion of the effectiveness of potential competitors, see Limit Price Theory, supra note 13, at 684-90.
116. The Justice Department has recently begun to argue that conglomerate mergers
can facilitate such pricing, which it refers to as "conglomerate interdependence and forbearance." See, e.g., United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.,. 324 F. Supp. 19
(D. Conn. 1970).
·
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creasing their K division's retaliation against KRER and by reducing their E division's retaliation, or vice versa (where the
harm-inflicted to cost-incurred ratio for the last act of retaliation that would be necessary for an independent K against KRER
is higher than its counterpart for an independent E), and by enabling KE to use any excess reciprocatory power K or E enjoyed
in its relations with KRER. In fact, in such circumstances, the
K-E merger will also facilitate KRER's contrived oligopolistic
pricing by reducing its communication costs to K and E, by reducing its costs of retaliating effectively against K and E by permitting it to retaliate where the relevant marginal harm to cost
ratio is best, and by letting it use any excess reciprocatory power
it has vis-A-vis either of these MPs. Moreover, the power-pooling
argument described above also implies that such conglomerate
mergers will reduce the cost and increase the profitability of
predatory pricing. 117
Of course, conglomerate mergers that eliminate an effective
potential competitor or facilitate contrived oligopolistic or predatory pricing may still increase competition in comparison with
the status quo or with the independent entry of the outside MP,
for such mergers may also generate static and dynamic efficiencies which increase competition in many ways. Thus, my analysis
suggests that the competitive effect of any conglomerate merger
will depend on (1) the factors that determine the effectiveness of
potential competition, 118 (2) whether the acquiring firm was, or
was close to being, the relevant market's best-placed potential
entrant, (3) the factors that affect the pre-merger profitability of
contrived oligopolistic pricing to the established merger partner
E, 119 ( 4) whether Kand E have a common rival KRER and whether
K has a tougher reputation than E, (5) the size of the dynamic
and marginal static efficiencies the merger generates, 120 and (6)
whether E was, or was close to being, better placed to make an
additional QV investment than any other established or potential
competitor, and the frequency with which E was, or was close to
being, some established rival's closest competitor.
117. A conglomerate merger may also facilitate predatozy pricing by giving E access

to K's capital. But see note 112 supra.
118. See note 115 supra.
119. See note 61 supra; text at notes 57-60 supra.
120. As I have already suggested in the horizontal merger context, one could develop
a decentralizing decision procedure that would make the decision to merge depend on the
pro-competitive impact of such efficiencies without requiring the government to estimate
their magnitude.
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The Competitive Impact of the Toe-Hold Merger Doctrine

Bork bases his conclusion that the application of the toe-hold
merger doctrine will always decrease competition on two premises: (1) that the private profitability of a conglomerate merger
to its initiator depends solely on its ability to generate business
efficiencies and (2) that the value to the relevant consumers of
the efficiencies alternative mergers would generate always increases with their value to the merger's initiator. This section will
explain why I reject both these premises and why the toe-hold
merger doctrine may in fact tend to achieve its goal of increasing
competition.
I reject the first premise because, as we have already seen,
K may find a K-El merger profitable for nonefficiency as well as
for efficiency reasons. K may be able to profit from a K-El merger
(1) because the merger facilitates K's and El's contrived oligopolistic (and predatory) pricing, (2) because K can induce El to sell
itself on favorable terms (a) by threatening to enter itself or (b)
by threatening to execute with some alternative established firm
E2 a merger that would substantially and uniquely 121 increase the
damage E2 could (legally) do to El, 122 and (3) by enabling K to
exploit various investor misperceptions. 123 Moreover, there is no
reason to believe that the merger that generates the most profitable efficiency for K will also incr~ase K's profits most for these
nonefficiency reasons. For example, the fact that a K-El merger
would generate more marginal efficiencies than a K-E2 merger
does not imply that K could gain more by threatening El with a
merger with E2 than by threatening E2 with a merger with El.
Hence, I suspect that firms like K will often profit most from
mergers that generate fewer profitable efficiencies than their alternatives. Hence, even if the value of such efficiencies to K and
the relevant consumers were monotonically related, 124 one could
not assume that K would always choose the merger that gener121. Obviously, if El's merger with K would simply result in another outside firm's
executing an equally damaging merger with E2, K's threat would not be efficacious.
122. For example, a K-E2 merger would increase this damage ifit generated marginal
static efficiencies for E2 and E2 originally was often El's closest rival.
123. See P. STEINER, MERGERS (1975). I should note, however, that even if this motivation accounted for a substantial number of the conglomerate mergers of the 1960s, investors have probably learned enough from the subsequent performance of the companies
involved to make it an unimportant cause of future conglomerate mergers.
124. I.e., even if an increase in the private profitability of the relevant efficiencies was
always associated with an increase in the benefits they generated for the consumers in
question.
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ated efficiencies that were most beneficial to the relevant consumers (much less the merger that was most beneficial to such
consumers overall).
In fact, however, the business and consumer benefits various
efficiencies will generate are not monotonically related. I would
be surprised if the value to buyers of the static and dynamic
efficiencies alternative conglomerate mergers can generate were
even highly correlated with their value to the MPs. Let me treat
static efficiencies first. The value of a marginal static efficiency
(that will not carry forward to an expansion) to the merged concern will equal the amount by which it increases the concern's
OCAs in relation to those customers the concern was originally
best placed to serv·e plus the amount of new OCAs it creates by
increasing the number of customers the merged concern is best
placed to obtain. On the other hand, if the merged firm takes full
advantage of the increase in its OCAs and if the merger does not
affect the net position of the relevant buyers by changing the
contextual costs of the merged firm and its rivals, the benefits
such marginal static efficiencies confer on buyers in the merged
firm's market will equal the amount by which they reduce the
merged firm's rivals' BCAs. More particularly, when the merged
firm is second-best placed both before and after the merger, the
benefit the buyer receives will equal the size of the relevant efficiency; when the merged firm was second-best placed before the
merger but is best placed after, the benefit will equal the size of
the original best placed supplier's BCA; finally, when the merged
firm was worse-than-second-best placed pre-merger but secondbest placed post-merger, the relevant benefit will equal the difference between the size of the efficiency achieved in relation to
the customer in question and the amount by which the established merger partner was originally worse-than-second-best
placed.
Obviously, then, it is reasonably likely that the conglomerate
merger whose efficiencies add most to its participants' joint returns will be less beneficial to the relevant buyers on this account
than an alternative merger that will improve the marginal static
position of a company that is often second- or close-to-secondbest placed, despite the fact that the latter merger would confer
more benefits on the relevant market's buyers. Hence, at least
where marginal static efficiencies are concerned, the premise that
the value of efficiencies to sellers and buyers are monotonically
related fails.
Moreover, even excluding the perverse cases in which a
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merger-induced reduction in the established partner's (11" 0 + R)
barriers reduces competition, the value of a dynamic efficiency
(or that portion that carries over to an expansion) to the merger
partners and its value to the market's customers are unlikely to
correlate strongly. On the one hand, the private value of such an
efficiency-induced expansion to the merged firm equals the difference between the supranormal profits it nominally yields (the
OCAs and OMs the merged firm realizes on the new project
minus the normal amount of profits on the investment in question) and the avoidable damage it does to the established partners' pre-existing projects. On the other hand, the value of such
an efficiency-induced expansion to the relevant consumers equals
the sum of the consumer surplus they realize when buying the
new product or patronizing the new outlet or plant and the value
to them of the price cuts its introduction induces suppliers of the
original product set to make. Thus, an aspiring conglomerate
merger participant may execute a merger that permits an
efficiency-induced expansion that is less valuable to the relevant
consumers than the expansion an alternative merger would have
induced because the expansion the executed merger permits (1)
tended less to benefit consumers by reducing or eliminating various rivals' BCAs (and OMs), (2) generated less consumer surplus
for the buyers of the new product or service, or (3) did more
damage to the pre-existing projects of the established merger
partner. Hence, even if the conglomerate merger partners can
profit from the tendency of their merger to increase the established partner's ability to expand, the conglomerate merger that
maximizes the profits the merged concern realizes on its mergerinduced expansion may not maximize the benefits the outsider's
merger confers on the relevant market's buyers. Moreover, in
some cases, th~ outsider may choose a merger that will not generate any dynamic efficiencies because the tendency of an alternative merger to increase the ability of a prospective established
partner to expand may actually reduce the merged concern's
profits. This perverse result will obtain when the mergergenerated reduction in the established partner's (11" 0 + R) barriers
will harm the merged concern by inducing another (still better
placed) established firm to ·make a QVinvestment by eliminating
the monopolistic investment disincentives that previously deterred its expansion (by making it profitable for the merged firm
to expand if the rival in question did not). Accordingly, even if
conglomerate firms always executed the merger that generated
efficiencies that were most valuable for them, and even if these
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conglomerate mergers never injured buyers, they would often not
execute the merger that would have most benefited the relevant
market's buyers.
Of course, the unpersuasiveness of Bork's argument against
the toe-hold merger doctrine does not imply that the doctrine
itself makes any sense. However, a tentative defense can be offered for the toe-hold merger doctrine, or at least for its premise
that - from the perspective of the goal of increasing competition
- K's choice of a merger partner will be distorted in the direction
of relatively large established firms (EL) as opposed to relatively
small established firms (Es).
Such a distortion could arise for two different sorts of reasons. First, a K-Er, merger might be more likely to increase K's
profits by performing functions that did not benefit, or indeed
actually harmed, the relevant buyers - e.g., by enabling K to
better use its ability to harm its merger partner by entering itself
or merging with an alternative firm or by increasing the merged
firm's ability to contrive oligopolistic prices. Second, the value to
K-EL of the efficiencies a K-EL merger would generate may exceed its counterpart for a K-Es merger by more than the contribution a K-EL merger would make to the relevant buyers' welfare
would exceed its conterpart for a K-EL merger. I suspect that, on
both these accounts, K-Ei' mergers will be relatively more attractive to K than they are beneficial to the relevant buyers. In general, K can probably inflict more harm on larger than on smaller
established firms. Moreover, K-EL mergers will be likely to increase K's and EL's total contrived OMs more than K-E8 mergers
will increase K's and Es's (since EL has more customers to exploit
and more information to contribute to K - though these effects
will be offset to the extent that EL has less need for K's information). In addition, since the ratio of the times large firms are best
placed to the times they are second-best or close-to-second-best
placed may well be higher than its counterpart for small firms, 12;;
the marginal static efficiencies K-Ei mergers generate may be
relatively more profitable than beneficial to consumers relative to
their K-E8 counterparts. Finally, in comparison with their K-Es
125. Recall that the contribution marginal efficiencies make to the merged firm is a
function of the number of customers the MPs are best placed to serve, while the contribution such efficiencies make to the relevant buyers is a function of the number of times
the MPs are second-best placed. If .relatively large firms tend to produce differentiated
goods that consumers either strongly prefer or do not particularly like while relatively
small firms tend to produce cheaper, less differentiated goods that are many buyers'
second choices, the textual assumption would be justified.
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counterparts, the dYIJ.amic efficiencies (or static efficiencies that
apply to expansions as well) that K-Ei,· mergers generate will also
be relatively more profitable to the merged firm than they are
beneficial to the relevant buyers (since EL is likely to have greater
monopolistic incentives to expand 126 and since EL's new variant
will reduce the OCA to an independent rival less often than
E's).121
Of course, these results would not justify a toe-hold merger
doctrine unless the distortions they establish are typically critical
- i.e., unless the K-Es mergers would typically be more procompetitive when they were less profitable and the K-Es mergers
are profitable in themselves (would be executed if the K-EL mergers were prohibited). Still, the competitive case for the toe-hold
merger doctrine is considerably stronger than Bork's conclusion
suggests. 128
III.

CONCLUSION

The Antitrust Paradox offers much to any lawyer or economist concerned with antitrust. The book concisely explicates the
nonscale business efficiencies which various horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate practices can generate, cogently analyzes
the significance and interaction of various legal doctrines, and
clearly illuminates the economic behavior involved in many
individual cases.
Unfortunately, however, although Bork is generally right
about what's wrong, he is usually wrong about what's right. In my
opinion, Bork's approach is undermined by his failure to consider
the full implications of monopolistic competition and second
best. In particular, I believe that this failure has led him to misformulate the antitrust laws' tests oflegality; to ignore the important distinction between the standards the current antitrust laws
contain and those that would be established by an allocatively
optimal antitrust policy; to misspecify the conditions for resource
126. This argument would cut against the toe-hold merger doctrine if EL and E8
typically faced monopolistic disincentives - i.e., typically were uniquely well placed to
add to their industry's QV investment. However, I believe that firms will rarely occupy
such a position.
127. This result is implied by the fact that buyers will not benefit if EL'S new variant
is better-placed to steal one of EL's original customers than any of EL's original rivals for
such customers (since E'L will not compete against itself).
128. If I could surmount my own doubts about the legitimacy of such comparisons
under the current antitrust laws, I would undoubtedly prefer an approach that is more
selective than the toe-hold merger doctrine's crude rule - i.e., that determined on a caseby-case basis whether the outside firm could have executed profitable and competitively
superior mergers in the relevant market.
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misallocation; to misstate the probable allocative efficiency of
various business practices; to underestimate the feasibiliy of oligopolistic, retaliatory, and predatory pricing; and to overlook the
possibility that nonoligopolistic restrictions of unit output, quality, and variety might also occur in the absence of a traditional
monopoly.
Many of the phenomena with which The Antitrust Paradox
is concerned cannot be adequately studied with currently accepted conceptual structures. To progress, we will need a vocabulary that facilitates theorizing about the phenomena I have
termed QV investment, QV investment competition, QV investment misallocation, (natural and contrived) oligopolistic margins, competitive advantages, contextual costs, individualized
pricing, and across-the-board pricing. Regrettably, I suspect that
the resulting theories will justify many positive, legal, and policy
conclusions that are inconsistent with Professor Bork's sanguine
judgments about the efficiency of an unregulated economy. Most
important, I suspect that such analyses will demonstrate that
oligopolistic and predatory pricing are more troublesome than
Bork supposes, that horizontal and conglomerate mergers are
anti-competitive and misallocative more often than he believes,
and that various vertical practices are less inherently desirable
than he concludes. In any case, I am confident that if such theories are combined with the valid insights Bork so effectively communicates in The Antitrust Paradox, they will enable the courts,
the legislatures, and their company to make better legal and policy decisions. 129
129. There is considerable evidence that the Burger Court is far more ready than its
predecessors to accept the kinds of sophisticated economic arguments that Professor Bork
and I are advocating. See Markovits, The Burger Court, Antitrust, and Economic
Analysis, in a forthcoming collection of essays on the Burger Court, edited by Vincent
Blasi and published by the American Society of Law Teachers.

